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AGORA, DIGNITY, AND DISCRIMINATION: ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL SHORTCOMINGS OF




In the immediate wake of Obergefell, some states began to consider en-
acting new "religious conscience" laws that would legally excuse refusals
of service to LGBT persons. The broadest of these proposed statutes, such
as Mississippi's House Bill 1523 (H.B. 1523), would create a near-
absolute right for businesses open to the general public to discriminate
against sexual minorities and transgender persons. This Essay considers
the constitutional status of such laws and posits that they stand on du-
bious constitutional ground. First, enactments of this sort violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying other-
wise applicable legal protections to LGBT persons. Second, individuals
and businesses that rely on these new enactments in order to discriminate
against LGBT customers are arguably state actors when acting consist-
ently with the state's encouragement under the "nexus" theory of state ac-
tion and, accordingly, accountable under the Equal Protection Clause.
Third, and finally, even if such enactments are constitutionally valid,
government may not provide any targeted support to individuals or
businesses that operate on a pervasively discriminatory basis against
LGBT persons.
On the other hand, however, some states have moved in the opposite di-
rection, enacting very broadly crafted anti-discrimination laws that re-
quire entities generally open to the public to refrain from discriminating
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University of Alabama School of Law. The University of Alabama Law School
Foundation supported this project through a generous summer research grant. I also
wish to acknowledge and express my thanks to the University of Washington School
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this Essay during the summer of 2016. Caroline Mala Corbin, Rick Garnett, Andy
Koppelman, Jim Oleske, and Tim Zick all provided helpful and insightful comments
and observations on earlier iterations of this Essay. The usual disclaimer applies: any
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against LGBT persons. Difficult questions exist regarding the permissible
scope of such enactments. Just as government may not encourage private
businesses to discriminate, it may not regulate religious entities in the
same way it may regulate supermarkets and gas stations. A church, syn-
agogue, or mosque stands outside the public marketplace, or agora, and
has a right to maintain and enforce policies that reflect the tenets of the
faith. Just as the government may not encourage businesses open to the
public to discriminate in ways that would be unlawful if enacted as a di-
rect social regulation, government may not require private religious
communities to treat believers and non-believers on equal terms.
The Essay posits that in order to determine when religious entities have a
right to be self-governing, we must carefully disentangle the public sphere
from the private sphere. The state creates and maintains the agora, or
public marketplace, and has the power to regulate access to it in order to
promote the health, safety, welfare, and morals of the community. Just as
the state may legislate to prevent and deter health nuisances, such as fire
hazards and unsanitary conditions, it may also legislate to eradicate
moral nuisances, such as various forms of invidious discrimination.
This power to eradicate moral nuisances, however, cannot sweep so
broadly or deeply as to deny self-constituted communities offaith the abil-
ity to hold and practice the tenets of their faith outside the public market-
place. To be sure, drawing the line of demarcation between the truly pub-
lic and the truly private will not be an easy undertaking. Even so,
however, it is an essential undertaking if we are to secure both equality
and religious liberty in the contemporary United States.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2015, the Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges,' which required all states to recognize both same sex
1 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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marriages and the equal dignity of families headed by same-sex couples.
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Kennedy explained:
Excluding same-sex couples from marriage. . . conflicts with a cen-
tral premise of the right to marry. Without the recognition, stability,
and predictability marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma
of knowing their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the
significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, rel-
egated through no fault of their own to a more difficult and uncer-
tain family life. The marriage laws at issue here thus harm and hu-
miliate the children of same-sex couples.
In other words, state governments denying same-sex couples the right to
marry imposed a dignitarian harm on such couples-and on their chil-
dren as well. "Stigma" and "humiliation" imposed by the government, in
the context of the denial of a fundamental constitutional right, constitute
grave constitutional harms.3 To avoid the imposition of these harms,
"same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all
States. "
In sum, Obergefell squarely holds that "the right to marry is a funda-
mental right inherent in. the liberty of the person, and under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liber-
Id. at 2600-01.
See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (characterizing the
discriminatory denial of access to a place of public accommodation as a serious and
"stigmatizing injury," an injury that "is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering
discrimination on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently because of their
race"). Roberts stands for the proposition that the stigmatizing harm of denials of
service is not limited to racially based denials of service. There is no good reason to
view discrimination based on sexual orientation or transgender status as any less
socially harmful than denials on account of sex, religion, or race. Indeed, it would be
quite possible to renormalize discrimination against LGBT persons as constituting a
subset of sex-based discrimination. The EEOC has adopted this position. See What You
Should Know About EEOC and the Enforcement Protections for LGBT Workers, EEOC, https:
//www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/enforcement.protectionsIgbt workers.cfm
(last visited Dec. 19, 2016) ("While Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not
explicitly include sexual orientation or gender identity in its list of protected bases,
the Commission, consistent with Supreme Court case law holding that employment
actions motivated by gender stereotyping are unlawful sex discrimination and other
court decisions, interprets the statute's sex discrimination provision as prohibiting
discrimination against employees on the basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity."). The EEOC's position enjoys some support in relevant Supreme Court
precedent. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-82 (1998);
see also Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197 (1994). Professor Koppelman, who arguably
pioneered this argument, appears to have the verdict of history on his side.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607.
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ty."5 The same-sex couples challenging state bans against recognition of
same-sex marriage sought nothing more than "equal dignity in the eyes
of the law" and "[t]he Constitution grants them that right."6 As Justice
Kennedy explained, "[ilt follows that the Court also must hold-and it
now does hold-that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to rec-
ognize a lawful same-sex marriae performed in another State on the
ground of its same-sex character.'
In the wake of Obergefell religious conservatives and their political al-
lies have successfully sought the enactment of a raft of new "religious lib-
erty" laws by state legislatures." Political controversy has followed in the
wake of these legislative proposals because, if enacted into law, these bills
would directly encourage local privately owned businesses to refuse ser-
vice to same-sex couples if the owners possess religious, or in some cases
merely "moral" objections to providing a particular good or service to
LGBT persons.9 Given the timing of the push to enact such laws-the
movement did not arise until after some states began to recognize same-
sex marriages-their proponents would be very hard pressed to deny that
the purpose and effect of these statutes is to privilege denials of service to
sexual minorities and transgender persons. Not simply to privilege such
denials, but to do so selectively and notwithstanding the fact that the
business refusing service is not operated by a church or a religious organ-
ization, is entirely secular in nature and plainly lacks a self-evident reli-
gious purpose or character, is otherwise open to the general public, and
purports to serve members of the general public.o
Id. at 2604.
6 Id. at 2608.
Id. at 2607-08.
8 SeeJames M. Oleske, Jr., "State Inaction, "Equal Protection, and Religious Resistance
to LGBT Rights, 87 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1, 4 n.4, 10-11 nn.29-30 (2016) [hereinafter
Oleske, State Inaction]; see also Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars:
Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2522
(2015) (noting that religious conservatives have been advocating measures that
protect against "complicity" with behaviors or practices that religious conservatives
oppose and describing these legislative efforts as "a locus of mobilized political action
seeking law reform designed to preserve traditional sexual morality").
' The broadest bills, such as Mississippi's House Bill 1523 and Missouri's Senate
Joint Resolution 39, seek to legally privilege refusals of service premised on either
objections to same-sex marriage or to sexual activity outside the context of a
heterosexual married couple. See infra notes 11 & 12 and accompanying text. More
narrowly targeted "conscience" or "complicity" laws are limited in scope to religious
or moral objections to weddings by same-sex couples or couples that include a
transgender person. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 8, at 2542-52, 2558-65. It also
bears noting that many states have adopted "conscience" laws that excuse medical
care providers and pharmacists from providing birth control or abortion-related
services. See id. at 2554-58.
10 Interestingly, states did not respond to Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), by
rushing to enact laws to protect the ability of private businesses to refuse to provide
1224 [Vol. 20:4
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State legislatures sometimes craft these so-called "conscience" laws
with a remarkable potential scope of application.' Mississippi's House
Bill 1523 ("H.B. 1523"), arguably the broadest of these so-called "con-
science" laws to achieve enactment into law, appears to authorize refusals
of service based on any kind of religious or moral belief that involves an-
12tipathy toward LGBT persons. The effect of such laws would appear to
services to interracial couples based on religious or moral objections to interracial
marriages. See James M. Oleske Jr., The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing the
Unequal Treatment of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages, 50 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 106-10, 116-17 (2015) [hereinafter Oleske, Unequal Treatment]
(observing that neither Congress nor state governments sought to protect religiously
motivated objectors to interracial marriage post-Loving and noting the utter paucity
of contemporary academic support for the enactment of such laws); see also Oleske,
State Inaction, supra note 8, at 38 (arguing that the normative arguments for providing
"conscience" exemptions that facilitate private discrimination based on sexual
orientation or transgender status are not self-evidently any different, or any stronger,
than the arguments that were rejected in the 1960s with respect to enacting
"conscience" exemptions that facilitated racial discrimination). As Professor Oleske
cogently has observed, "although arguments can be made that religious objections to
same-sex marriage are more defensible than religious objections to interracial
marriage, those arguments are not nearly strong enough to explain why the type of
broad exemptions from anti-discrimination laws that were never even discussed in the
academy for interracial-marriage objectors are now widely championed for same-sex
marriage objectors." Oleske, Unequal Treatment, supra, at 124.
" See, e.g., S.J. Res. No. 39, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2016). If enacted,
Missouri's Senate Joint Resolution 39 would have placed a constitutional amendment
on the November 2016 ballot that, among other things, would have provided
complete legal immunity for denials of service to LGBT persons. See id. at § A
(proposing a new amendment to Missouri's state constitution, section 36, which, if
ratified by the voters, would, via section 36(2) (6), prevent the state government from
"recogniz[ing] or allow[ing] an administrative charge or civil claim against a religious
organization or individual" that refuses service to LGBT persons); id. (providing in
section 36(6) (1) that "[a] religious organization or individual may assert an actual or
threatened violation of this section as a claim or defense in a judicial or
administrative proceeding, or other hearing or dispiite resolution process").
Missouri's Senate Joint Resolution 39 passed Missouri's state senate but died in a
house committee during the 2016 legislative session. See Jack Suntrup, Religious
Freedom Measure Defeated in Committee, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 28, 2016), http:
//www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/religious-freedom-measure-defeated-in-
committee/article_2850451b-eae2-576b-9df3-457a616bd8f9.html (reporting that Mo. S.J.
Res. 39 "was defeated on a 6-to-6 vote" in a house committee). Like H.B. 1523 in
Mississippi, which was enacted into law, S.J. Res. 39 sought to create a general license
for business owners to engage in targeted discrimination against sexual minorities
and transgender persons. See infra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing Miss.
H.B. 1523).
" The "Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination
Act" would have taken effect on July 1, 2016. H.B. 1523, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2016) § 1, § 13. However, on June 30, 2016, a federal district court enjoined the state
from enforcing it on both Equal Protection Clause and Establishment Clause
grounds. Barber v. Bryant, No. 3:16-CV-417-CWR-LRA, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86120,
2017] 1225
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be to create a legal shield against any otherwise applicable state statutes
or common law rules that might create legal liability for denials of service
13
to sexual minorities and transgender persons. For example, a "con-
science" law like H.B. 1523 would presumably prevent a lesbian couple
from suing a photographer who breaches a contract to photograph their
wedding to obtain compensatory damages.14 It would also, in theory, pre-
clude breach of contract claims wholly unrelated to a wedding ceremony
itself-for example, a refusal by a plumber to unclog a blocked drain in a
lesbian couple's kitchen. So long as the refusal of service relates to a reli-
gious or moral objection to same-sex marriage, an exception from other-
wise-applicable general state laws would apply.
In this Essay, I posit that the new wave of religious accommodation
laws are motivated by animus toward LGBT persons and will clearly pro-
duce discriminatory effects. Laws of this kind, which encourage and facil-
itate targeted discrimination against sexual minorities and transgender
at *54, 79 (S.D. Miss. June 30, 2016); see also Campbell Robertson, Mississippi Law
Protecting Opponents of Gay Marriage Is Blocked, N.Y. TIMEs (July 1, 2016), http://nyti.ms/
29fj2Ae. Gov. Phil Bryant (R-MS) has promised to mount "an aggressive appeal" of
this ruling. Id. On its face, H.B. 1523 prohibits a private business owner from being
subjected to "discriminatory action" by the state if the business owner acts upon "a
sincerely held religious belief or moral conviction" to deny services to LGBT persons
based on their sexual orientation or transgender status. H.B. 1523 at §§ 3-4. In turn,
the statute defines "discriminatory action" as including the state "[i]mpos[ing],
levy[ing] or assess[ing] a monetary fine, fee, penalty or injunction." Id. at § 4(1) (e).
Accordingly, H.B. 1523 would seem to preclude a state court from ordering
compensatory damages for breach of contract or in any other way providing an
effective remedy to LGBT persons denied goods or services by a Mississippi business.
Section 5 resolves any residual doubts about the remarkably broad scope of this
statute: "A person may assert a violation of this act as a claim against the state
government in any judicial or administrative proceeding or as defense in any judicial or
administrative proceeding without regard to whether the proceeding is brought by or in the name
of the state government, any private person or any other party." Id. at § 5(1) (emphasis
added). H.B. 1523 would therefore seem to turn off the law of contracts for LGBT
persons: not only for those with religious objections to same-sex families, but also with
respect to any business owner who claims a "moral" objection to serving such
customers as well.
" For an illustrative list of these so-called "conscience" proposals, see Oleske,
State Inaction, supra note 8, at 4 n.4. (listing proposals similar to H.B. 1523 pending or
enacted in over a half dozen additional states).
14 In this respect, the "conscience" laws appear to be seriously vulnerable to
attack on the same grounds as Colorado's Amendment 2, which left anti-
discrimination rules in place for all groups except sexual minorities and, indeed, did
not generally restrict home rule powers with respect to anti-discrimination polices
except for sexual orientation. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-34 (1996)
(invalidating Colorado's Amendment 2 because it "impos[ed] a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group," was "born of animosity toward
the class of persons affected," and, accordingly, failed to advance a permissible
legitimate government interest).
[Vol. 20:41226
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persons, are unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.5 Just as the
states themselves, after Obergefel4 cannot directly discriminate against
sexual minorities, they also may not attempt to achieve indirectly that
which they may not command directly.'6 Moreover, Palmore v. Sidoti
teaches this lesson: government may not ratify, and by ratifying extend,
private social prejudice.
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 632
(invalidating Amendment 2, a Colorado constitutional amendment that abolished
anti-discrimination protections for sexual minorities, because "the amendment has
the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single
named group, an exceptional and, as we shall explain, invalid form of legislation" and
because Amendment 2's "sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered
for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the
class it affects"). As Justice Anthony Kennedy explained in Romer, "[a] law declaring
that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to
seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the
most literal sense." Id. at 633. It bears noting that the new state "conscience" laws have
precisely this effect. See infra Part II.
" See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 463-66 (1973).
1 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). ("The Constitution cannot control such [private
racial] prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."). To be
clear, I do not take a position on the larger issue of state mini-RFRAs-Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts-that provide generic exemptions from neutral laws of
general applicability but which were not self-evidently enacted with a discriminatory
purpose and which, in most of their applications, do not regularly produce
discriminatory effects against any specific minority group. There are, of course, many
difficult questions of law and policy that remain to be worked out regarding both the
federal RFRA and state mini-RFRAs. In the wake of Hobby Lobby, for example, whether
publicly traded corporations may claim the benefit of RFRA-type enactments is an
important and difficult question. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751, 2774 (2014). This is so because to recognize an employer's right to maintain
religiously motivated practices in the workplace creates the prospect of a square
conflict of religious values between a corporation's leadership and board and its
individual employees. To state the problem more directly, may a publicly traded
corporation maintain religiously motivated practices that significantly burden the
rights of conscience of its employees? For, if corporations enjoy rights under RFRA-
type laws, the exercise of these rights is quite likely to burden the rights of employees
to avoid having their rights of conscience unduly burdened. To give a concrete
example, could a Roman Catholic business owner insist on placing devotional statues
of the Virgin Mary in all workspaces? Even if doing so offends the religious
sensibilities of employees who happen to be Jehovah's Witnesses? And, in the event of
a conflict of religious values between management and a corporation's employees,
precisely whose religious values will triumph? To say that ownership or managerial
rank should be controlling would be to undo Title VII's protection against religious
discrimination in the workplace. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). Indeed, by
intentionally creating religiously offensive workspaces, a clever discriminator could
effectively avoid having to employ persons associated with a particular faith or sect.
My immediate focus in this Essay, however, is the constitutionality of post-Obergefell
2017] 1227
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Even if laws like H.B. 1523 are not unconstitutional because they in-
tentionally facilitate private discrimination, a strong argument exists that
individuals who act under the auspices of such laws are state actors. Reit-
man v. Mulkey has been interpreted to hold that when the government
encourages private actors to discriminate, and a nominally private party
acts consistently with the government's invitation, it engages in state ac-
tion under a theory of a nexus (or "state encouragement")." Thus, even
if the new spate of state "conscience" laws are not themselves unconstitu-
tional on Equal Protection Clause grounds, to the extent that these stat-
utes encourage private discrimination against sexual minorities and
transgender persons, a private business owner who invokes these statutes
in order to discriminate may be held accountable under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause because the state has actively and directly encouraged the
discriminatory behavior.o
Finally, even if the federal courts were to conclude that the new state
"conscience" laws are neither facially unconstitutional nor transform pri-
vate businesses that invoke them tojustify discrimination into state actors,
the state must disassociate itself from any business that engages in invidi-
ous forms of discrimination. Government may not offer any direct or tar-
geted support to businesses that engage in discrimination that the Con-
stitution prohibits with respect to the state itself. The Supreme Court, in
Norwood v. Harrison, held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits state
government from offering targeted financial support to pervasively dis-
criminatory institutions. This rule should apply with full force with re-
spect to any person or business enterprise that invokes a "conscience" law
22in order to discriminate against LGBT persons.
There is, however, another side of the coin that merits careful and
sustained consideration. Just as the government may not seek to affirma-
tively promote religiously-motivated private discrimination, it also may
not seek to regulate faith communities with respect to their religious be-
23
liefs, doctrines, and rites. Public accommodation laws may not be con-
stitutionally applied in ways that burden the ability of self-constituted
communities of faith to practice their religion outside the public's mar-
"conscience" laws that seek to immunize, from any form of legal liability, intentional
discriminatory acts by businesses otherwise open to the public.
387 U.S. 369 (1967).
* See infra Part III.
20 See id.
a 413 U.S. 455, 463--65 (1973).
See infra Part V.
" See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON
LAW, RELIGION, AND LOYALTY 27-28, 56-87 (1998) [hereinafter CARTER, DISSENT OF
THE GOVERNED].
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24
ket square. The difficulty, of course, is drawing and maintaining the
precise line that demarcates private religious belief from marketplace
participation.
This Essay will proceed in five Parts. Part II considers the difficult
problem of defining the public and private spheres. It also examines the
constitutional status of the recent spate of post-Obergefell religious free-
dom "conscience" laws that authorize private businesses to refuse service
to sexual minorities and transgender persons and concludes that they are
inconsistent with the central imperative of the Equal Protection Clause-
namely, that government laws and policies motivated by animus, i.e., na-
26
ked dislike of a particular minority group, lack any legitimate purpose.
Part III extends this argument by positing that even if such laws are not
facially unconstitutional, when a person or enterprise acts consistently
with the state's invitation to discriminate, the person or enterprise should
be found to have engaged in state action-and therefore be subject to
suit under the Equal Protection Clause.
Part IV looks at the problem from the other side of the coin: How far
may government go in commanding non-discrimination within society
generally? This Part argues that government regulations cannot regulate
religious beliefs or rites, and also posits that government should refrain
from regulating activities that directly relate to the core religious activi-
ties of a faith community (such as a K-12 school). On the other hand,
comprehensive non-discrimination regulations are really no different in
kind or scope from regulations proscribing maximum hours, minimum
wages, and the provision of workers' compensation insurance. One could
also analogize comprehensive anti-discrimination laws to regulations de-
signed to prevent and punish public nuisances-like pollution, fire haz-
ards, or unsanitary conditions-because discrimination constitutes a
harm to the general public as Well as to its direct victims."
24 See id. at 27-32. Professor Carter posits that "[f]or religious communities in
which ritual and activity are as important as belief, the old saw remains both accurate
and valuable: We are what we do." Id. at 32.
21 See infra Part IV.
26 U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
17 In point of fact, the Supreme Court already has embraced an analogy between
the social costs of discriminatory membership policies in large organizations that are
effectively open to the public and acts of violence; neither is entitled to meaningful
First Amendment protection. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984)
(observing that "like violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that
produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact, such
[discriminatory membership] practices are entitled to no constitutional protection");
see also id. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("The Constitution does not guarantee a right to choose employees, customers,
suppliers, or those with whom one engages in simple commercial transactions,
without restraint from the State. A shopkeeper has no constitutional right to deal
only with persons of one sex."). Moreover, because discrimination in places of public
2017] 1229
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Assuming the federal courts hold that the new "conscience" laws are,
in fact, constitutional, Part V argues that government may not constitu-
tionally lend targeted support to persons or entities that engage in perva-
sive forms of discrimination constitutionally prohibited by the govern-
ment itself. Finally, Part VI offers a brief overview of my arguments and a
conclusion.
28The state creates and maintains the public marketplace-the agora.
It may constitutionally condition access to the public market square on a
wide variety of regulations-regulations designed to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of employees, of customers, and of the public more
generally. Moreover, just as the state itself cannot create a kind of "Pink
Triangle Jim Crow" by directly segregating places of public accommoda-
29tion based on sexual orientation or transgender status, it cannot indi-
rectly achieve this result by encouraging private business owners to perva-
sively discriminate against sexual minorities.
II. DISENTANGLING THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN THE CONTEXT
OF CAESAR'S FORUM: THE NEW STATE "CONSCIENCE" LAWS
SQUARELY VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
To state my thesis simply, in the public marketplace, a dollar in one
person's hand should be no less valid than a dollar in another person's
hand. This rule does not relate to the difficulty of forcing members of
unpopular minority groups to seek a good or service elsewhere. Some
proponents of very broad schemes of religious accommodation, such as
Professor Douglas Laycock, have attempted to frame questions of reli-
accommodation is a social evil that the government possesses the power to prevent, a
law that impedes such conduct is by definition narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government interest. To the extent that the law prevents discrimination,
it directly advances the state's compelling interest in combating the social evil of
discrimination.
" The agora was the public marketplace in Athens. By "agora" I mean the public
marketplace, town square, or Caesar's forum. MABEL LANG, THE ATHENIAN CITIZEN:
DEMOcRAcY IN THE ATHENIAN AGORA 5 (rev. ed., 2004) ("Center of public activity,
the Agora was a large open square where all the citizens could assemble. It was used
for a variety of functions: markets, religious processions, athletic contests, military
training, theatrical performances, and ostracisms."). See generally JOHN M. CAMP, THE
ATHENIAN AGORA: EXCAVATIONS IN THE HEART OF CLASSICAL ATHENS (Colin Renfrew
& Jeremy A. Sabloff eds., 1986) (providing a comprehensive social, political, and
historical overview of the Athenian Agora, including treatment of its role and
function as a central public marketplace).
" See Timothy Zick, Bathroom Bills, the Free Speech Clause, and Transgender Equality,
78 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 1, 17) (on file with author)
(positing a First Amendment based challenge to N.C. Bill 2 but also observing that
the most promising constitutional challenge "sounds in equal protection and/or due
process" and, accordingly, that the federal courts are more likely to invalidate such
laws based on "equal protection and due process concern [s]").
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gious accommodations largely in terms of a business owner's rights of
conscience versus the very mild inconvenience imposed on a would-be
customer denied immediate access to a good or service.
30 However, this is
simply not an apt framing, or adjustment, of the relative equities. The in-
jury to a transgender person refused service at a bakery is not the loss of a
cupcake or the time and trouble of locating another bakery; instead, it is
the denial of basic human dignity that the refusal of service represents.
Separate but equal is, to paraphrase the majestic words of Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren in Brown, intrinsically unequal because it demeans and
degrades those denied a good or service on equal terms." The denial of
service-the targeted exclusion and rejection-is an offense to the digni-
ty and equal personhood of the person refused service in a business oth-
erwise holding itself open to any and all members of the public." To miss
this fundamental reality requires a kind of willful blindness that probably
arises most easily if a person is not a member of any minority community
(and, hence, unlikely to ever find himself on the receiving end of this
kind of targeted assault on his dignity and personhood)."
" DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, Afterword to SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIoUs LIBERTY:
EMERGING CONFLICTS 198-201 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter
LAYCOCK, EMERGING CONFLICTS].
" Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("To separate them from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling
of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.").
" In this regard, it bears noting that the federal government and virtually all
state governments generally prohibit discrimination by businesses open to the public
on the basis of race or sex. See Oleske, State Inaction, supra note 8, at 45 n.155 ("Forty-
eight states (all but Alabama and Mississippi) prohibit private employment
discrimination on the basis of disability, while forty-seven states (all but Alabama,
Georgia, and Mississippi) prohibit it on the basis of race, religion, national origin,
and sex, and a slightly different forty-seven states (all but Arkansas, Mississippi, and
South Dakota) prohibit it on the basis of age.").
" Professor Laycock's nonchalance about the dignitarian harm caused when
businesses otherwise generally open to the public engage in direct and overt forms of
discrimination is rather surprising: his commitment to securing the rights of religious
believers seems to have led him to seriously understate, if not misstate, the effects of
denials of service on minority persons. See LAYCOCK, EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note
30, at 198-202. Professor Laycock states his position with striking clarity:
In my view, the right to one's own moral integrity should generally trump the in-
convenience of having to get the same service from another provider nearby.
Requiring a merchant to perform services that violate his deeply held moral
commitments is far more serious, different in kind and not just in degree, from
mere inconvenience.
Id. at 198. I categorically disagree with this proposed weighing of the relative equities.
Denying service, and perhaps posting a sign as a warning to unwanted gay or
transgender customers to go elsewhere, see id. at 198-201, involves the merchant
imposing harms on the community that are little different from nuisances that our
laws routinely prohibit (such as pollution, unsanitary conditions, or fire hazards).
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Laws like H.B. 1523 and North Carolina's equally discriminatory
House Bill 23 present a conflict between our constitutional commitments
to equal human dignity and religious freedom. In order to resolve the
conflict correctly, we must create and maintain a workable distinction be-
tween the truly private and the truly public. Private religious beliefs and
35practices lie beyond the legitimate reach of the state's regulatory power.
On the other hand, a society that permits every person or self-constituted
community of faith to be self-regulating in the name of conscience would
36quickly prove to be ungovernable.
If we think carefully about the context in which a religious accom-
modation is sought, we can determine accurately whether it relates to
private religious belief and practice-or reflects an attempt to evade gen-
eral regulations of the market 'that apply with an even hand to all market
participants in order to make the marketplace open and accessible. At
the same time, however, we should also take care not to define the public
Moral hazards are not less harmful to the community because the harms they cause
are psychic rather than physical in nature. One also wonders if academic support for
"conscience" exemptions would run as strong for religionists who harbor openly
racist, sexist, or anti-Semitic religious beliefs. See Oleske, Unequal Treatment, supra note
10, at 116-21; see also Laura S. Underkuffler, Odious Discrimination and the Religious
Exemption Question, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 2069, 2087 (2011) (questioning the legal and
moral logic of treating sexual orientation discrimination as less odious than other
kinds of invidious discrimination, such as discrimination based on race, sex, religion,
or national origin, and observing that "exemption proponents single out sexual
orientation as the one trait or status that should be trumped by religious claims"). My
strong suspicion is that this support would not run as strong-which, if true, lays bare
the root assumption that undergirds many arguments for post-Obergefell "conscience"
laws that legally privilege denials of service to LGBT persons: discrimination against
LGBT persons is less socially opprobrious, and more understandable, if not fully
justifiable, than other forms of invidious discrimination. Even if this is true as a
matter of social fact (and I contest this proposition in the strongest possible terms),
government may not act to ratify, and by ratifying extend, a hierarchy of noxious
social prejudices. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984). As Professor
Oleske has observed, "[t]he more fitting approach might well be to honor that
original struggle for civil rights by giving full force to its lessons in other relevant
areas." Oleske, Unequal Treatment, supra note 10, at 121.
3 H.B. 2, §§ 1.2-1.3, 2d Extra Sess., Sess. Law 2016-3 (N.C. 2016). North Carolina
House Bill 2 requires all persons in North Carolina to use public bathrooms in
schools and public buildings that correspond to "their biological sex." Id. at § 1.2(b),
§ 1.3(b). Unlike Mississippi's H.B. 1523, however, North Carolina's House Bill 2 only
regulates the use of bathrooms owned by public schools and other state and local
government entities-it does not seek to encourage private businesses to organize
cisgender patrols to undertake enforcement. In this sense, although North Carolina
House Bill 2 appears to be unconstitutional because it is clearly the product of
targeted animus toward transgender persons-see, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)-it does not involve state efforts to encourage or facilitate
private discrimination by non-state actors.
See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944).
6 See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
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sphere too broadly-religious communities have a right to be self-
defining and to limit their membership to individuals who share and
practice the tenets of the faith. What is more, some enterprises that
could be seen as "public," such as religiously-identified K-12 schools,"
probably should be classified as "private" for purposes of applying anti-
discrimination laws.39
7 SeeJOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY'S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
185-86 (2012) ("The right of assembly protects the members of a group based not
upon their principles or politics but by virtue of their coming together in a way of
life."); see also STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAw
AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 143 (1993) [hereinafter CARTER,
CULTURE OF DISBELIEF] (arguing that "the central acts of faith of a religious
community-the aspects that do the most to produce shared meaning within the
corporate body of worship-are entitled to the highest solicitude by the courts");
William Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and
Collisions of Law and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2415 (1997)
("The state must allow individual nomic communities to flourish -or wither as they
may, and the state cannot as a normal matter become the means for the triumph of
one community over all others.").
42 U.S.C. § 12181 (7) (J) (2012).
I should note that some "private" activity occurs in places open to the general
public; my use of the terms "private" and "public" relates to the nature of the activity
in question, rather than its locus. For example, some religious sects actively
proselytize, and seek to gain new congregants through this activity. Consistent with
this objective, many religious services are open to the public on a voluntary basis by
faith communities seeking new converts. One could view such activities as "public"
rather than "private" in character. This would be mistaken, however. The relevant
dichotomy relates to the use of the public marketplace to buy and sell goods and
services-or to solicit broad-based public support for organizations and causes-not
merely spaces that are open to the public. Moreover, many religious activities take
place in public spaces. Mormon missionaries, for example, travel the streets and
sidewalks seeking new adherents to their faith. See THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
MORMONISM 183-93 (Terry L. Givens & Philip L. Barlow, eds. 2015). However,
Mormon missionaries are engaged in "private" activity-at least in the sense that I
mean to use that term. The key distinguishing factor is that the faith community does
not purport to accept any and all comers based solely on their ability to purchase a
good or service, or subscribe to a membership. Membership in a faith community is
always provisional and premised on the novitiate committing herself to accepting the
sect's relevant teachings and living her life in a fashion consistent with those
teachings. By way of contrast, a coffee stand proprietor does not generally require
anything more from a would-be customer than the ability to pay the posted price. But
cf Seinfeld, The Soup Nazi (NBC Television Broadcast Nov. 2, 1995) (presenting a
fictional Manhattan-based soup seller who uses idiosyncratic preferences to decide to
whom he will sell his soup and thundering "Nothing for you!" or "No soup for you!"
at trangressors); see also Al Brumley, One Wrong Move with Soup Nazi and You're in Soup,
SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Jan. 7, 1996, at F5 (discussing the Soup Nazi's various
foibles). Simply put, religious communities are more like the Soup Nazi than Amazon
or Ebay; they do not purport to be open on equal terms to any and all comers and
they maintain rigid, inflexible rules for those who seek full membership rights within
the community.
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At one end of the spectrum, then, is the government itself. However
pervasive or widely held within society in general, the government itself
may not rely on animus or naked prejudice as a basis for imposing a bur-
den or withholding a benefit." Nor may the government ratify-and by
ratifying extend-existing social prejudices.4 ' As Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger explained in Palmore, "[p] rivate biases may be outside the reach
of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."4 1
Accordingly, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the equal protection principle implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty under the Fifth Amendment,3 preclude local, state, and the fed-
eral governments from adopting policies predicated on irrational forms
of animus toward discrete and insular minorities.
On the other hand, however, the First Amendment conveys substan-
tial autonomy on individuals and organizations to hold beliefs that the
government itself may not. Moreover, self-constituted communities,
whether or not religious in character, have a constitutional right to de-
termine with whom they will associate and assemble.45 In the United
States, government could not compel the Roman Catholic Church to or-
dain women as priests. Or require the Ku Klux Klan to admit African
American women to membership. Even if an organization holds sexist,
racist, or homophobic beliefs, and uses those beliefs to exclude others,
the First Amendment privileges truly private entities from direct forms of
government coercion.
The question, in my mind, becomes where to locate a law firm, a res-
taurant, or a bakery on the spectrum that lies between these two poles.
Clearly, the federal courts will not directly apply constitutional anti-
discrimination principles to a McDonald's fast food restaurant or a Hil-
ton hotel. But, may a legislative body enact positive legislation that ex-
" See U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (holding that "a
bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group" does not constitute
a legitimate government interest and, accordingly, laws motivated by overt animus
toward a particular minority group violate the Equal Protection Clause). Under this
principle, a law animated by naked animus is irrational and, hence, unconstitutional.
See id. at 538.
41 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) ("The Constitution cannot
control such [private racial] prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.").
42 Id.
41 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944).
* See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(observing that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry").
" See INAZU, supra note 37, at 174-86; see also N.Y. State Club Ass'n. v. City of New
York, 487 U.S. 1, 12 (1988).
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tends constitutional non-discrimination principles to such businesses?
The question, until recently, seemed well settled: If an entity was open to
the general public, it was subject to pervasive forms of non-discrimination
46
regulation. After all, no one's religion compels them to own and oper-
ate a McDonald's or a Jiffy Lube on a discriminatory basis.
As Chief Justice Burger observed in Roy, the fact that a government
regulation "confront[s] some applicants for benefits with choices" is ir-
relevant, provided that the regulation does not "affirmatively compel ...
by threat of sanctions" individuals "to refrain from religiously motivated
conduct or to engage in conduct that they find objectionable for reli-
gious reasons."4 8 In Roy, a would-be applicant for Social Security benefits
claimed that obtaining and using a Social Security number would "'rob
the spirit' of his daughter and prevent her from attaining spiritual pow-
er."49 The Supreme Court squarely rejected a free exercise claim seeking
to obtain benefits without using a Social Security number to obtain them:
"The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the
Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with
the religious beliefs of particular citizens.",o
By parity of logic, anti-discrimination laws applicable to businesses
open to the general public merely condition access to the public market
on compliance with the anti-discrimination requirement-such laws
simply do not force anyone to enter the public marketplace in the first
place. Moreover, I am not familiar with any major religious sects that re-
quire adherents to operate businesses open to the general public, on a
discriminatory basis, in order to obtain personal salvation.
To claim a direct, as opposed to indirect, burden on religiously mo-
tivated conduct, the claimant would have to assert that their religion re-
quires them to operate a business open to the public on a discriminatory
basis. The Supreme Court has been, quite properly, skeptical of claims of
this sort.5 ' Cases like Roy and Jimmy Swaggart make plain that government
has no general obligation to exercise its police powers in ways that are
" See N.Y. State Club Ass'n., 487 U.S. at 12 (noting that "in defining the
nonprivate nature of these associations [dining clubs]" particular attention should be
given to "the kind of role that strangers play in their ordinary existence" and that the
failure to exclude non-members from regular use of ostensibly private dining clubs
renders the clubs subject to government regulation as places of public
accommodation).
47 See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1986).
4 Id. at 703 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
4 Id. at 696.
'o Id. at 699.
"1 See, e.g., Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equal'n, 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990)
(observing that "[t] here is no evidence in this case that collection and payment of the
tax violates appellant's sincere religious beliefs" and concluding that "appellant's
religious beliefs do not forbid payment of the sales and use tax").
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maximally congenial to persons who hold idiosyncratic religious beliefs
that conflict with generally applicable health, safety, welfare, and morals
regulations. So too, nominally private clubs that are, de facto, open to
many non-members on a regular basis may be required to observe statu-
tory non-discrimination rules.5 2 Large, mass-membership organizations
are also subject to such regulations, unless they can show that discrimi-
natory exclusion relates to a core purpose for the organization existing.54
In fact, the Supreme Court already has addressed, in some detail, the
question of how to disentangle the public and private. In the 1980s, in
the context of applying non-discrimination laws to organizations like the
Jaycees and the Rotary Club, the Supreme Court found that the First
Amendment creates a constitutional privilege for private organizations to
exclude individuals based on their race, sex, religion, national origin,
and sexual orientation. However, to invoke successfully the First
Amendment as a shield against the application of an anti-discrimination
law, the organization must show that it is not generally open to the public
and that its exclusionary membership practices are central to the organi-
zation's associational reasons for existing. Thus, an entity that is gener-
ally open to the public, or that does not maintain discrimination as a
core reason for its associational activities, cannot successfully deploy a
First Amendment defense to block the application of a local, state, or
federal anti-discrimination law that regulates places of public accommo-
dation.57 For organizations that are generally open to the public and
which do not make promoting discrimination a core purpose, the gov-
ernment's compelling interest in preventing discrimination trumps the
entity's interest in associational freedom.
5 See N.Y. State Club Ass'n. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1988).
In fact, the Supreme Court carefully distinguishes between intrinsically private,
and intimate, associations such as marriage and family life, and relationships that
"lack[ ] these qualities-such as a large business enterprise." Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984). Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for the Jaycees
majority, explained that the free association claims by commercial enterprises are
"remote from the concerns giving rise to this constitutional protection" and
"[a]ccordingly, the Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State's
power to control the selection of one's spouse that would not apply to regulations
affecting the choice of one's fellow employees." Id.
* Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648-52 (2000).
* See N.Y State Club Ass'n., 487 U.S. at 13; Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary
Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544, 548 (1987); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
" Dale, 530 U.S. at 658-61; N. Y State Club Ass'n., 487 U.S. at 13.
17 See N. Y State Club Ass'n., 487 U.S. at 13-15; Rotary Int' 481 U.S. at 547-48.
5 Caroline Mala Corbin, Speech or Conduct?: The Free Speech Claims of Wedding
Vendors, 65 EMORY L.J. 241, 299 (2015) ("The state has not just an important interest
but a compelling interest in ending discrimination."). Professor Corbin cogently
argues that a targeted denial of service to LGBT persons "denies equal access to
goods and services and it denies equal citizenship" and, moreover, "there is no other
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If one considers carefully the relevant Supreme Court cases involving
First Amendment-based challenges to local, state, and federal anti-
discrimination laws, it becomes clear that participation in the public
marketplace may be conditioned on refraining from discriminating
based on invidious characteristics. An organization or entity cannot hold
itself out as open to the public and, concurrently, invoke the First
Amendment as a shield for targeted, discriminatory exclusions based on
invidious forns of discrimination. In fact, government arguably lacks the
ability to convey an exemption on enterprises that, as a general matter,
are open to the general public.5 9 As Professor Jim Oleske has argued,
"courts should conclude that carving out exemptions from antidiscrimi-
nation laws so as to allow commercial business owners to refuse service to
same-sex couples unconstitutionally deprives those couples of equal pro-
tection of the.laws.,6 0
Certainly, government has no constitutional obligation to relieve
King & Spaulding or, the Jaycees from obligations arising from laws pro-
scribing discrimination. The rule obtains because participation in the
public marketplace, and making goods and services available to the pub-
lic, refutes the claim that the business entity exists to advance a limited
associational bond between its members or a particular ideological vi-
sion.6 If you sell groceries to the public, it's not really plausible to say
that you exist to sell groceries only to men, Christians, or white people.
Accordingly, attempting to say "we're open to those whom we choose to
serve" does not generally wash as a means of facilitating invidious forms
of discrimination against would-be customers.
To be sure, some counter examples do exist that feature a commer-
cial enterprise, open to the public, that makes exclusions of potential
62
customers a core part of its identity and business model. One could take
the view that a business like Curves, a women-only gym, should not be
way to guarantee full access and citizenship other than to bar these refusals." Id.; see
also Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 8, at 2566-78 (discussing various harms, both
physical and psychological, that religious accommodation laws visit on those denied
access to goods and services).
5 See Oleske, Unequal Treatment, supra note 10, at 142-47.
* Id. at 146.
6 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 277
(2015) (arguing that corporations, unlike individuals, do not possess individual faith
commitments and also noting that recognition of corporate religious beliefs will inev-
itably undercut the religious rights of employees).
62 John Briley, Calculating the Curves, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2003), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35340-2
0 05Marl4.html (noting that
"Curves gyms are no-frills, women-only facilities").
" See Karen M. Appleby & Elaine Foster, Gender and Sport Participation, in GENDER
RELATIONS IN SPORT 12-13 (Emily A. Roper ed., 2013) (discussing the creation of
"Curves for Women" gyms in 1992 and the chain's subsequent success and the crea-
tion of other women-only exercise and sport facilities, including "in higher education
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free to make this choice-that, instead, it must organize as a private club
or organization if it wishes to exclude men. This position is at least super-
ficially attractive. After all, suppose a corporation wished to operate
"White Power" gyms that would permit only Caucasian persons to be-
come members? Most reasonable people would reject out of hand a fit-
ness club festooned with "whites only" signs.
Curves presents a hard case because gender-based exclusions are not
always or inevitably subordinating. Certainly, such classifications can rest
on insulting or degrading stereotypes-but the existence of single gender
institutions, such as college Greek letter organizations, suggests that
there might still be a legitimate role in contemporary society for single-
sex environments.
State-sponsored colleges and universities lend significant financial
and logistical support to single-sex Greek letter organizations. One could
characterize this as unconstitutional state support of discrimination, but I
believe thatJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed the better view, when
writing for the majority in United States v. Virginia. If a state wishes to
maintain separate educational programs for men and women because it
persuasively claims that significant pedagogical benefits will result, then
the Equal Protection Clause requires "substantial equality" in the quality
64
of the programs. The standard of review applied to gender classifica-
tions, intermediate scrutiny, also seems to reflect the intuition that gen-
der classifications are not as reliably invidious as racial and religious clas-
sifications." Even so, however, any use of gender classifications that is
degrading or subordinating will not pass constitutional muster, for a
purpose to discriminate is not a legitimate, much less an important, gov-
ernment objective."
As a general matter, discrimination in public places should be regu-
lable. Most, but not all, entities operating in the public marketplace are
"public" in character, not "private." As such, they are subject to compre-
hensive anti-discrimination mandates from the federal, state, or local
governments.
settings where women report feeling more comfortable and free in these settings al-
lowing them to learn at their own pace without fear of criticism").
64 518 U.S. 515, 551-55 (1996).
6 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
6 See id. at 724-26. As Justice O'Connor explained in Hogan, "MUW's policy of
excluding males from admission to the School of Nursing tends to perpetuate the
stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job." Id. at 729-30. Stereotyp-
ing a particular profession is not a legitimate, much less a substantial, government
interest. Id. at 725 (observing that "[c]are must be taken in ascertaining whether the
statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions" and that "if the statu-
tory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one gender because they are pre-
sumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective
itself is illegitimate").
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Moreover, these general principles seem quite, suitable for drawing a
line of demarcation between permissible forms of accommodation and
impermissible encouragements to discriminate. If an entity probably en-
joys a freestanding First Amendment right to disregard a non-
discrimination ordinance or statute, a legislature should be quite free to
codify an exemption-whether in the anti-discrimination provision itself
or in a freestanding "conscience" law. Enacting a law that does nothing
more than enforce and protect a constitutionally protected associational
interest does not violate the Constitution. The problem, however, is that
state laws like Mississippi's H.B. 1523 have a scope of application that
grossly outstrips the underlying First Amendment right of association.
They extend a right to discriminate that the First Amendment, as applied
in New York State Club Association, Rotary, and Jaycees, would not protect of
its own force.
The other constitutional defect in the recent "conscience" laws, both
as proposed and also as enacted, is that they plainly seek to protect tar-
geted discrimination against only one minority group-members of the
67
LGBT community. More general exemptions might stand a better
chance of surviving constitutional review-just as a general state law that
removed the power to establish local anti-discrimination policies would
681
have stood a better chance of surviving judicial review in Romer v. Evans.
Of course, more broadly crafted "conscience" laws are unlikely to be en-
acted because of the overwhelming consensus that racial, religious, and
" See Barber v. Bryant, No. 3:16-CV-417-CWR-LRA, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86120,
at *68 (S.D. Miss. June 30, 2016) ("The deprivation of equal protection of the laws is
HB 1523's very essence. It violates the Fourteenth Amendment." (citing United States
v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013)).
68 Colorado's Amendment 2 did not make any generalized alteration in the
home rule powers of Colorado cities and counties; instead, it disallowed only local
ordinances that proscribed discrimination based on sexual orientation. Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996). As Justice Kennedy explained, "[i]t prohibits all
legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government
designed to protect the named class, a class we shall refer to as homosexual persons
or gays and lesbians." Id. at 624. Of course, Colorado voters would have been much
less likely to enact an ordinance that authorized comprehensive forms of
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, veteran status,
and other criteria commonly proscribed in local anti-discrimination ordinances. Laws
targeting an unpopular minority are far more likely to secure enactment than laws
that seek to authorize comprehensive forms of discrimination in workplaces and
businesses. See id. at 627 ("Homosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class
with respect to transactions and relations in both the private and governmental
spheres. The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal
protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of
these laws and policies."); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938) (observing that laws targeting "discrete and insular minorities" should
be subject to "searching judicial inquiry" because of the serious risk that they seek to
codify and enforce social prejudice rather than legitimate public policies).
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gender-based discrimination by businesses open to the public is unac-
ceptable and wrong.69
More broadly crafted state laws, even if capable of enactment, would
be preempted by federal laws with respect to race, sex, and religion. The
Civil Rights Act of 1964," the Civil Rights Act of 1866," and other federal
laws and policies would have a preemptive effect on state laws that at-
tempted to authorize denials of service comprehensively.12 A state gov-
ernment cannot enact and enforce a law that conflicts with an otherwise
valid federal law." Thus, even if more broadly crafted, the enacting body
would still know that, in practice, a law's effect would be limited to LGBT
persons-rendering the ostensibly "inclusive" license to discriminate
highly targeted. Indeed, the interplay of state and federal law make such
a law no less targeted than Colorado's Amendment 2.
Moreover, just like Amendment 2, the federal courts will find these
ostensibly broader statutes inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause.
After all, the Supreme Court has long held that "if the constitutional
conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at
the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."4
Our constitutional tradition-at least since Brown-simply does not
embrace the idea that basic civil and political rights may be withheld
from unpopular minority groups-even if the antipathy has religiously
motivated roots. Indeed, if the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had included a
"conscience" exemption for places of public accommodation, then res-
taurants, hotels, and theaters across the South (and nation) would have
" See Oleske, State Inaction, supra note 8, at 9-11, 45-46.
7 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
" An Act to Protect All Persons in the United States in Their Civil Rights, and
Furnish the Means of Their Vindication, 14 Stat. 27 (Apr. 9, 1866).
12 See U.S CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 3601-
31(2012).
" U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution of Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."); see also
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-06, 432-34 (1819) (invoking the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI and invalidating a Maryland state law because it
conflicted with a valid federal statute's purposes and objectives).
74 U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); see also Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Moral disapproval of a
group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection
Clause because legal classifications must not be drawn for the purpose of
disadvantaging the group burdened by the law." (internal quotations and citations
omitted)).
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remained firmly segregated by race-with the justification shifting from
state laws requiring racial segregation to sincerely held religious beliefs
that integrated public facilities were displeasing to God and that business
owners' rights of conscience should take priority over the ability of Afri-
can American citizens to eat in restaurants, stay in hotels, or watch mo-
tion pictures.
It also bears noting that, in the wider world, constitutional courts
have not merely accepted and sustained statutes that protect the dignity
of minority persons-they often require the enactment of such laws to
both prevent such dignitarian harms and provide a sure remedy when
they do occur.15 The idea that a private moral or religious belief would
justify a bakery posting a sign saying "We Do Not Serve Jews" would be
unthinkable in most of the democratic world. Indeed, in Germany it
76
would constitute a criminal offense. Why then, in the United States,
should we be willing to discount to zero the real and powerful psycholog-
ical harm that a refusal of service imposes on the victim?" The answer is
quite obvious: We should not.
See RONALDJ. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 98-102
(2006) (discussing the German Federal Constitutional Court's interpretation of the
Basic Law, Germany's constitution, as imposing affirmative, or positive, legal
obligations on the government to secure human rights within German society
generally, notably including contexts involving interactions between non-state
actors).
'6 See id. at 127-30 (discussing Germany's strong commitment to using civil and
criminal law to eradicate and punish pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic speech).
7 Cf LAYCOCK, EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 30, at 198-99 (advocating the
posting of "We Do Not Serve LGBT Persons" signs visible to the public because "[a] n
advertising requirement would avoid unfair surprise" and positing that "the benefits
[of such a public notice requirement] would outweigh the costs"). By way of contrast,
the Fair Housing Act contains an exemption for a landlord who lives in a single
housing unit, with no more than four rental units, but expressly prohibits advertising
residential rental housing by race. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 803, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3603(b) (2) (2012); see also id. at § 3604(c) (prohibiting discriminatory
advertisements for the sale or rental of residential real estate). For instructive
discussions of the so-called "Mrs. Murphy" exception to the FHA, see Robert G.
Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and § 3604(c): A New Look at the Fair
Housing Act's Most Intriguing Provision, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 192 (2001); James
D. Walsh, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy Exemption to the Fair
Housing Act, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 605, 607 (1999). In other words, Congress
viewed advertising discriminatory rental properties with racial restrictions as more
objectionable than the practice of actually using race to screen renters in the first
place (at least for a rental property with no more than five living units occupied by
the landlord). See Schwemm, supra, at 192-97. This point of view is entirely
understandable; open and notorious forms of discrimination, under the color of law
no less, seriously undermine the nation's fundamental commitment to securing equal
civil rights for all persons. If a business could legally post a sign stating "No Queers,"
when it could not legally post an equally noxious sign stating its refusal to serve
2017] 1241
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
Moreover, in some significant and important ways, U.S. law already
recognizes that conduct premised on discriminatory motives constitutes a
harm not just to the direct victim, but also to other members of the
group and to the larger community as a whole. This is precisely why many
states and the federal government have laws that enhance the sentence
for crimes motivated by invidious forms of animus-so called "hate
crimes." Despite the potential chilling effect that enhanced sentencing
for hate crimes might place on those who embrace hate-based ideologies,
the Supreme Court unanimously sustained the constitutionality of such
sentencing enhancements in Wisconsin v. MitchelL" A unanimous Su-
preme Court credited Wisconsin's view that imposing longer sentences
for hate-motivated crimes was an appropriate policy because "bias-
inspired conduct. . . is thought to inflict greater individual and societal
harm."
Of course, a rational business owner will seek to maximize returns on
her investment by serving all comers. But, this reflects a classical econom-
ics perspective;8o behavioral economics tells us that a business owner
interracial couples or their families (e.g, "No Racial Mongrels"), a strong signal is sent
that hatred of LGBT persons is less objectionable-less odious-than other kinds of
prejudice. The Equal Protection Clause prevents government from ratifying or
endorsing social prejudice, regardless of its precise motivation. See Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). Moreover, in the United States, religion was routinely used
to justify not only racial discrimination, but also the institution of human chattel
slavery itself. See ALFRED BROPHY, UNIVERSITY, COURT, AND SLAVE: PRO-SLAVERY
THOUGHT IN SOUTHERN COLLEGES AND COURTS AND THE COMING OF CIVIL WAR 30
(2016). Simply put, if a religious motive or belief does not justify a "conscience"
exemption for race-based refusals of service, it should not suffice to justify
discrimination against LGBT persons either.
" 508 U.S. 476, 486-90 (1993).
7 Id. at 487-88.
80 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 171-87
(1995). Professor Epstein argues that anti-discrimination laws impose unjustified costs
on society and should be abandoned. See id. at 186-87. He also posits that employers
who practice invidious forms of discrimination will compete less effectively against
employers who hire the best available employees: "Moreover, the employer who
sacrifices economic welfare for personal prejudice will pay for her preferences on the
bottom line." Id. at 176. Such an employer "will sacrifice resources to indulge
consumption choices, and will be at a systematic disadvantage relative to employers
whose economic motivations are more rational." Id. If markets are free and open,
problems of invidious discrimination will solve themselves-with world enough, and
time. See id. at 176-77.
The problem, of course, is that this framing device completely ignores the harm
of discrimination on those systematically excluded from employment opportunities
because of their race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation. It
also assumes a state of perfect information and fully integrated and competitive
markets for goods and services. These conditions might, or might not, exist in the
real world. And, again, if discrimination is immoral, a social evil akin to acts of
violence, society's net utility might well be enhanced, rather than reduced, by legal
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might derive greater utility from discriminating against a particular sub-
set of would-be customers because she subjectively values refusing service
to members of minority groups that she dislikes more highly than max-
imizing the financial returns on her investment in her business. It is also
possible, in a community that holds widely shared prejudices and that
suffers from wide disparities in economic buying power that closely track
race, that a business's economic returns would actually be enhanced, ra-
ther than reduced, if the owner adopts discriminatory practices.
In sum, one need not possess the wisdom of Solomon to distinguish
and contrast a grocery store from a church, mosque, or temple. As a gen-
eral rule, a couple cannot simply present itself to a priest, imam, or rabbi
and demand to be married; religious entities maintain rules about access
to their religious facilities and rites.
Indeed, even the ability to participate in a religious service or rite
may be denied or withheld-for a good reason, a bad reason, or no rea-
son at all. Religious organizations are self-constituted communities of
faith;2 they have a right to exercise substantial autonomy in deciding
83whom to admit, or exclude, from their membership rolls. This freedom
rules aimed at extirpating it-assuming, of course, that one does not define "utility"
solely in terms of wealth maximization. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628
(1984). Many legal rules, basic to an Anglo-American system of ordered liberty, such
as the guilt beyond reasonable doubt standard that the government must meet to
secure a criminal conviction, are probably not "efficient" in the classical economics
sense of the term (i.e., they impose more social costs than they save). Even if that
were true, it does not seem a particularly compelling reason for abandoning the
reasonable doubt standard in favor of a less demanding one. We value the personal
liberty of criminal defendants more highly than the social cost of the false negatives
that the reasonable doubt standard produces.
8 For example, in 1940s Jackson, Mississippi, if a restaurant owner operated her
restaurant on a racially desegregated basis, her net returns might well fall rather than
rise-if white patrons boycotted the establishment precisely because it operated on a
racially integrated basis.
" See CARTER, CULTURE OF DISBELIEF, supra note 37, at 40 (arguing that faith
communities are "autonomous communities of resistance" and "independent sources
of meaning" and, as such, merit the ability to be autonomous and self-governing).
" See INAZU, supra note 37, at 167-76; see also CARTER, DISSENT OF THE
GOVERNED, supra note 23, at 53 (positing that government should respect the ability
of "self-constituted communities of faith that it has nurtured" to maintain their beliefs
and practices). Professor Inazu argues, with some force, that although "there is much
to be said for an antidiscrimination norm and the value of equality that underlies it,"
we must consider the fact that "our constitutionalism also recognizes values other
than equality, including a meaningful pluralism that permits diverse groups to
flourish within our polity." INAZU, supra note 37, at 175. For the record, I concur with
these sentiments and previously have said so in print. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If
judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, Free Exercise, and the (Underappreciated) Merits of
Smith, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1189, 1243 (2008) ("The whole purpose of judicially
enforced human rights, however, is not so much to better secure the rights of
popular groups (who can seek relief through legislatures and the democratic
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to exclude arises from the right of association-I think it also should be
seen as a freestanding free exercise interest.8 4 The right to hold a reli-
gious belief should encompass the right to participate in religious rites
required by those beliefs with co-religionists.
We could consider other organizations as well-and test them for
the degree to which they are truly private or public. For example, a New
Orleans carnival society that stages a Mardi Gras parade and ball on an
annual basis, and does not make invitations to its activities available to
the public, and does not make membership available to the general pub-
lic, can be easily distinguished from a Safeway or Burger King. The
sphere of the private certainly includes religious communities-but it is
not, or should not be, limited solely to religious communities. Any volun-
tary association that does not welcome the public, and that exists to pro-
mote associational relationships among persons sharing particular back-
grounds or characteristics, or ideological objectives that relate to targeted
policies of exclusion, should not be subject to mandatory statutory non-
discrimination rules.
The key distinction, however, is the degree to which an organization
or entity actually seeks to exclude the general public.8 ' To the extent that
an entity offers services to the general public, the claim that it is truly pri-
vate rings hollow. Thus, a bakery or photography studio open to the pub-
lic stands on very different First Amendment ground than a church or
private social club; when you hold yourself out as open to the public,
regulations consistent with this voluntary decision are consistent with the
reasonable expectations, and voluntary behavior, of the business owners.
The agora, or public market, is created and maintained by the com-
munity. It is a res publica-a public thing-a kind of commons. Accord-
ingly, the community should be permitted to regulate its use-including
the adoption of regulations that relate to the health, safety, and welfare
of both workers and customers. And, again, the existing case law makes
very clear that government has no general obligation to create faith-
based exceptions to neutral laws of general applicability that proscribe
invidious forms of discrimination by places of public accommodation.
Moreover, the creation of highly targeted licenses to discriminate
against particular minorities is itself an unconstitutional government pol-
process), but rather to ensure that unpopular minorities do not suffer unduly from
the caprice of democratically elected governmental officials.").
84 It could also, as Professor Inazu suggests, be characterized as an aspect of the
right of assembly. See INAZU, supra note 37, at 175-78.
85 Cf Richard A. Epstein, Public Accommodation Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
Why Freedom ofAssociation Counts as a Human Right, 66 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1282 (2014)
(arguing that the First Amendment's implied right of freedom of association should
apply fully and directly to businesses open to the public and characterizing public
accommodation laws proscribing discrimination by such as businesses as "a giant
form of overreach").
1244 [Vol. 20:4
AGORA, DIGNITY, AND DISCRIMINATION
icy-government may not withhold the benefit of generally applicable
86
laws from unpopular minority groups (of whatever kind or stripe). As
President Barack Obama observed in his second inaugural address, the
principle that "all of us are created equal-is the star that guides us still;
just as it guided our forebears through Seneca Falls, and Selma, and
Stonewall." Targeted discrimination is anathema to our commitment to
full and equal citizenship for all persons. Laws like H.B. 1523 are funda-
mentally inconsistent with the central mandate of the Equal Protection
Clause-namely, that government lacks a rational or legitimate interest
in codifying animus toward any particular group of citizens."
III. THE NEW RELIGIOUS "CONSCIENCE" LAWS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ENCOURAGE AND FACILITATE
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SEXUAL MINORITIES AND
TRANSGENDER PERSONS
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court developed and deployed a theory
of state action that held ostensibly private individuals and entities to be
state actors when the government encouraged iscriminatory behavior
and the individual or entity acted consistently with the state's encour-
agement. Consistent with this approach, the Supreme Court held that
the decision of a private lunch counter, located within an S.H. Kress store
in Greenville, South Carolina, to operate on a racially segregated basis
constituted state action when it did so, at least in part, to comply with a
local ordinance mandating the segregated operation of restaurants.
Chief Justice Earl Warren explained that "[w]hen the State has
commanded a particular result, it has saved to itself the power to deter-
mine that result and thereby 'to a significant extent' has 'become in-
volved' in it, and, in fact, has removed that decision from the sphere of
private choice."0 Moreover, "these convictions cannot stand, even assum-
ing, as respondent contends, that the manager would have acted as he
did independently of the existence of the ordinance.""1 The city's en-
couragement of private discrimination rendered the private discrimina-
tory conduct state action-even if the store would have operated on a
segregated basis in the absence of the city's ordinance mandating segre-
gated public accommodations.9 '
86 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-34 (1996).
1 President Barack H. Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2013).
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580-84 (2003) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
8 See Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
'0 Id. at 248.
91 Id.
" Cf. id. at 252 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Although the right of a private
restaurateur to operate, if he pleases, on a segregated basis is ostensibly left
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As a matter of logic, the more obvious equal protection claim would
have related to the city ordinance requiring the restaurant to operate on
a segregated basis-the ordinance itself straightforwardly violated the
Equal Protection Clause and the federal courts could have simply invali-
dated it." However, invalidating the ordinance would not have resulted
in either the overturning of the convictions for trespass or in the deseg-
regation of the Kress lunch counter. Indeed, the store's manager testified
that he had two reasons for asking the petitioners to leave-the city ordi-
nance, and "'local customs' of segregation."" The city contended that
this would have led him to operate on a racially segregated basis and
sought the arrest of the civil rights protesters for trespass regardless of
95the ordinance. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found the trespass
charge against civil rights protesters invalid on equal protection grounds
because the city encouraged private parties to racially discriminate, and
the Kress store acted consistently with this encouragement.
Reitman v. Mulkey provides another example of the nexus or encour-
agement theory of state action.7 California's Proposition 14, a successful
ballot measure, repealed two housing non-discrimination laws and re-
placed them with a constitutional rule that would permit a property own-
er to refuse to sell or rent property for any reason that the owner deemed
sufficient-including overt forms of racial discrimination.9" The Califor-
nia state courts found that the initiative was designed to encourage and
untouched, the Court in truth effectually deprives him of that right in any State
where a law like this Greenville ordinance continues to exist. For a choice that can be
enforced only by resort to 'self-help' has certainly become a greatly diluted right, if it
has not indeed been totally destroyed."). In justice Harlan's view, if the Kress store
would have operated its lunch counter on a segregated basis regardless of the city
ordinance, then state action was absent and the arrests were constitutionally
permissible. See id. at 251 ("Clearly Kress might have preferred for reasons entirely of
its own not to serve meals to Negroes along with whites, and the dispositive question
on the issue of state action thus becomes whether such was the case, or whether the
ordinance played some part in the Kress decision to segregate. That is a question of
fact.").
9 Id. at 247-48 (majority opinion).
" Id. at 248.
9 Id.
9 See id. (noting that "[t]he Kress management, in deciding to exclude Negroes,
did precisely what the city law required" and that "such a palpable violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment cannot be saved by attempting to separate the mental urges
of the discriminators"). Thus, the state's encouragement of the unconstitutional
action rendered the private action attributable to the government-even if, in theory,
the private business owner might have elected to maintain a policy of racial
segregation of the lunch counter without regard to the ordinance.
9 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
" See id. at 374 (noting that Proposition 14 effected the repeal of the Rumford
and Unruh Acts, which proscribed racial discrimination in California's housing
market).
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facilitate private racial discrimination in the residential housing market;
the Supreme Court accepted this characterization and, accordingly, held
that a racially discriminatory refusal to rent an apartment constituted
state action sufficient to bring the Fourteenth Amendment into play.99
In determining whether a private party's discriminatory action may
properly be attributed to the state, a court must "assess the potential im-
pact of official action [to] determin[e] whether the State has significantly
involved itself with invidious discriminations.,",00 When a state govern-
ment "significantly encourage [s] and involve [s] the State in private dis-
criminations," the private party's action may be attributed to the state
government and the party's discriminatory act subjected to constitutional
scrutiny.'0 '
To be sure, subsequent state action cases, such as Flagg Brothers, make
clear that a local, state, or the federal government may create general
laws that authorize private self-help without necessarily translating a pri-
102
vate entity's behavior into state action. However, a general law or com-
mon law rule against trespasses to private property is easily distinguisha-
ble from a law that targets trespasses by a particular minority group.1o' A
state law that seeks to encourage discriminatory behavior stands on dif-
ferent constitutional ground than a generic law that creates a general
104
right sounding in property, contract, or tort.
See id. at 372-77.
'oo Id. at 380.
01 Id. at 381; see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument
in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REv.
302, 320-21 (1995) (discussing the nexus test for state action).
102 Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-66 (1978). Then-Justice William
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, characterized New York as having failed to act to
limit the common law rights of a bailee to sell goods to satisfy an outstanding debt for
storage costs. See id. at 165-66. As Justice Rehnquist states the proposition, "the State
of New York is in no way responsible for Flagg Brothers' decision, a decision which
the State in § 7-210 permits but does not compel, to threaten to sell these
respondents' belongings." Id. at 165. The nexus or encouragement cases do not
involve truly neutral state laws or policies, but rather state laws that are designed to
push or nudge non-state actors toward unconstitutional behavior. See Krotoszynski,
supra note 101, at 317 n.74.
'0' See Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L.
REv. 473, 483 n.20 (1962) (arguing that state action should exist when a state enacts
legislation with the purpose and effect of facilitating private discriminatory acts).
104 See id.; see also Krotoszynski, supra note 101, at 316-17 & 317 nn.73-74. In this
sense, then, the federal RFRA and state mini-RFRAs are easily distinguishable from
laws like H.B. 1523 precisely because-unlike H.B. 1523-these laws do not
encourage highly targeted forms of religiously motivated discrimination against
particular minority groups. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Simply put, the
federal and state RFRAs were not motivated by a discriminatory purpose and do not,
as a general matter, routinely facilitate private discriminatory acts. See NeJaime &
Siegel, supra note 8, at 2520-22 (arguing that "[c]omplicity-based conscience claims
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As I have previously observed, "if the state either requires or invites
private parties to engage in behavior that the state could not itself under-
take, the private party's actions may constitute state action.105 Consistent
with this approach, lower state and federal courts have broadly read Reit-
man to stand for the proposition that when a private actor engages in un-
constitutional action at the invitation or encouragement of the govern-
ment, it engages in state action. o0
There is more than a little logic to this theory of state action: If the
government may not command directly discriminatory behavior, it
should not be able to achieve the same result by merely encouraging, ra-
ther than commanding, such behavior. In other words, if a particular pol-
icy would be unconstitutional if the state pursued it directly, it should be
no less unconstitutional because the state cleverly attempts to achieve its
unconstitutional objective through a nudge-or shove-rather than a di-
rect order. Constitutional values are undermined in both cases. Moreo-
ver, in both instances the government acts with discriminatory purpose
and the law at issue produces discriminatory effects.'o'
If the federal courts were to apply this strand of the state action doc-
trine to so-called state "conscience" laws that insulate businesses from the
legal consequences of denying goods or services to LGBT persons, a
strong argument exists that private businesses that engage in discrimina-
differ in form" from most 'run-of-the-mill RFRA cases because complicity claims
"focus[] on third parties in ways that the claims in the free exercise cases that RFRA
invokes do not").
"o' Krotoszynski, supra note 101, at 320.
' See, e.g., Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993),
rev'd in part, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir.), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Denver Area
Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (finding that a private
cable system operator engaged in state action when it censored public access
channels for indecent content incident to discretionary authority that Congress
conveyed to cable system operators by statute); Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582,
592 (D.C. Cir.), modified on other grounds, 712 F.2d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding state
action based on a nexus or encouragement where the federal government facilitated
Catherine Franz's decision to unlawfully deny visitation' rights to her ex-husband,
William Franz, and observing that "[t]he nexus is formed principally by the
defendants' encouragement and support of Catherine's decision to hide the children
from William").
10' See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). As a general rule, in order to
obtain heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must show
that the government acted with discriminatory purpose and that the law in question
produces discriminatory effects. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985)
(invalidating an Alabama constitutional provision stripping persons convicted of
crimes of their voting rights because the provision was motivated by overt racial
animus and had disparate results); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-99 (1977)
(holding that an unexplained statistical disparity may establish the existence of
discriminatory intent).
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tory action at the encouragement of the state are state actors because of
the government's overt encouragement of such action. Given that many
of the states adopting such laws strongly resisted recognizing same-sex
marriages-and often same-sex families more generally-the move to
adopt "conscience" laws reflects an effort to im lement by indirect means
policies that Obergefell has squarely disallowed.0
To be clear, I do not suggest that states must adopt comprehensive
anti-discrimination laws. However, the new spate of proposed "con-
science" laws are clearly distinguishable from ones that do not regulate
private discrimination at all. Instead, the so-called "conscience" bills
would create general exceptions from otherwise applicable state laws and
policies, such as the law of contract, with the aim of facilitating adverse
treatment of sexual minorities and transgender persons. Indeed, these
proposed laws are simply not meaningfully distinguishable from the
kinds of pro-discrimination policies found to create state action in Reit-
man and Peterson.
I think the better argument is that laws like H.B. 1523 constitute sub-
stantive violations of the Equal Protection Clause and are facially uncon-
stitutional on this basis. Moreover, unlike cases such as Reitman and Peter-
son, in which invalidation of the state law would not prevent private
discrimination, invalidation of "conscience" laws would reinstate the gen-
eral fabric of the state's general laws (notably including the law of con-
tract). To be sure, a business owner might still refuse service to LGBT
persons, but would have to do so without the benefit of a legal shield for
such action that renders nugatory any potentially applicable general state
laws and policies that would provide a basis for damages or other kinds of
court-ordered relief.
IV. THE PERMISSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL SCOPE OF MANDATORY
NON-DISCRIMINATION LAWS
It bears noting that many states have moved in the opposite direction
and, rather than encouraging discrimination against LGBT persons,
maintain broadly written anti-discrimination statutes that prohibit dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity in places of
public accommodation.9 An important question exists regarding the
constitutional validity of such state and local non-discrimination laws
when applied to religious entities or persons who claim that their reli-
gious or moral beliefs require them to discriminate. To state the question
simply: May a state government legally require a business owner to pro-
10' See Oleske, State Inaction, supra note 8, at 11 n.32 (describing and discussing
immediate calls for "conscience" laws in several states after the Supreme Court issued
its decision in Obergefell).
109 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 51 (West 2016); N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296
(McKinney 2016).
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vide goods or services when doing so violates the person's sincerely held
religious or moral convictions?
Government may require places of public accommodation to serve
all members of the public without regard to race, sex, religion, or sexual
orientation. If a particular entity believes that it has a First Amendment
right to discriminate, then it must establish that it is not open to the gen-
eral public and that its reason for existing includes the exclusion of par-
ticular kinds of people. Hence, a major corporate law firm could not suc-
cessfully claim that their right to association included the right to
exclude women as partners."o Indeed, the Supreme Court found King &
Spaulding's efforts to invoke the First Amendment as a shield that pro-
tected gender bias utterly and completely without merit." Writing for a
unanimous bench, Chief Justice Burger observed that King & Spaulding
failed to show that its legitimate expressive and associational interests
"would be inhibited by a requirement that it consider petitioner for part-
nership on her merits" and also that "as we have held in another context,
'[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of ex-
ercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it
has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.'""
Consistent with this reasoning, a major corporate law firm may be
required to refrain from invidious forms of discrimination, notwithstand-
ing the associational nature of a general partnership engaged in the
practice of law. I seriously doubt that King & Spaulding would have fared
any better before the Supreme Court had it characterized its desire to
exclude women from the partnership as relating to sincerely held reli-
gious beliefs regarding the appropriate scope of female lawyers in a cor-
porate law firm. Cloaking the desire to discriminate in religious terms
should not alter or affect the basic constitutional analysis: Invidious forms
of discrimination are unconstitutional when practiced by the government
and also against the public policy of the United States when practiced by
non-state actors.
no Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 78-79 (1984).
.n See id. at 78.
" Id. (citing and quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973))
(alteration in original). Norwood clearly stands for the proposition that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits states from directing state resources to pervasively
discriminatory institutions. See infra text and accompanying notes 143-152.
"' See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). Indeed, the
Supreme Court characterized the government's interest in eradicating racial
discrimination as "compelling" and as a "governmental interest [that] substantially
outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners' exercise of
their religious beliefs." Id. at 604. At an earlier point in his academic career, Professor
Laycock wrote that racial discrimination in the public marketplace should not be
excused on religious liberty grounds. See Douglas Laycock, Tax Exemptions for Racially
Discriminatory Schools, 60 TEX. L. REv. 259, 263 (1982) (arguing that a business owner's
"objection to racial equality does not entitle him to be excused from these
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On the other hand, government may not command that an Imam
perform a same-sex marriage in his mosque. If a state law purported to
treat a mosque, temple, or church as a place of public accommodation,
and required the religious entity to refrain from any form of discrimina-
tion based on sex, race, or sexual orientation, such a law would be facially
invalid on First Amendment grounds. But, suppose a religious communi-
ty opens a fast-food restaurant on a busy commercial thoroughfare. May
the restaurant refuse to serve infidels? May it require women to cover in
order to receive service? Does the fact of religious ownership mean that,
even with respect to a commercial enterprise without any obvious reli-
gious character, the restaurant may put up a sign saying "No Blacks," "No
Jews," or "No Homosexuals," alongside, perhaps, a "No Shirt, No Shoes,
No Service" placard?'
For example, legally requiring a Roman Catholic priest to officiate at
a same-sex wedding, whether in the parish church or elsewhere, is simply
not the same thing as requiring an Olan Mills photography studio to
agree to photograph a same-sex wedding. An Olan Mills franchise owner
has already ceded a tremendous degree of her artistic control in order to
obtain and keep her franchise license-thereby to benefit from the
branding of her photography services business with a nationally recog-
nized purveyor of photography services. In sum, if a business owner is
obligations; when he participates in government or the secular economy, he must
obey the secular rules that apply to all"). Professor Laycock's seeming indifference to
discrimination based on sexual orientation is therefore puzzling. To be sure, race in
the United States has a particularly fraught history. But, if our goal is to secure equal
religious liberty for all, it seems very odd for the state to tolerate discrimination that is
religiously motivated if it believes the discrimination to be less serious or
opprobrious. The existence or nonexistence of religious exemptions plainly should
not turn on the popularity, or unpopularity, of the religious beliefs of a particular
sect. To adopt such an approach is to turn the non-discrimination aspect of the Free
Exercise Clause on its head. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524-26 (1993). Behaviors motivated by sincere religious beliefs
should be entitled to equal respect-or disrespect. See Linda C. McClain, Religious and
Political Values in Congruence or Conflict?: On Smith, BobJones University, and Christian
Legal Society, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 1959, 2007 (2011) (arguing that even if racial
discrimination holds a special place because of its deeply rooted nature and
connection to the practice of human chattel slavery, the Supreme Court's overall
approach to enforcing equal protection values makes it untenable to privilege
religiously motivated discrimination against LGBT persons).
114 See LAYCOCK, EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 30, at 198-201 (arguing that
LGBT persons denied goods or services because of their sexual orientation or gender
identity should simply seek them elsewhere because "the hardship imposed by
refusing to exempt conservative religious business people would far outweigh the
hardship to same-sex couples of allowing exemptions"). But cf Chai Feldblum, Moral
Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUs LIBERTY:
EMERGING CONFLICTS 123, 153 (Laycock et al. eds., 2008) (arguing that "[i]f I am
denied a job, an apartment, a room at a hotel, a table at a restaurant, or a procedure
by a doctor because I am a lesbian, that is a deep, intense, and tangible hurt").
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willing to comply with corporate regulations to maintain a franchise, she
has already ceded considerable artistic autonomy on a voluntary basis. As
a general matter, anyone who opens a business that is generally open to
the public should be seen as ceding the ability to pick and choose whom
they will, and will not, serve.
Despite my skepticism about the constitutional validity of state laws
that encourage or invite discrimination against sexual minorities and
transgender persons, constitutional limits plainly exist on how far gov-
ernment may go in requiring non-discrimination by non-state actors. In
this regard, a more fully developed theory of the "public" and the "pri-
vate" is needed in order to determine the permissible constitutional
scope of such anti-discrimination laws. Even if local, state, and federal
governments may constitutionally condition access to the agora on a wide
variety of regulations-from licensing to non-discrimination require-
ments-an important question remains about the outer limits of manda-
tory non-discrimination policies. The First Amendment provides a shield
against the government regulating our most intimate and private social,
religious, and political associations.
Professor Stephen Carter has written lucidly about the importance of
permitting self-constituted communities of faith to exist freely and to
march to the beat of a different drummer from those who embrace
mainstream American culture. As he explains it:
Religions are communities of corporate worship, or, as one might
say in this post-modern world, communities of sense and value,
groups of believers struggling to come to a common understanding
of the world. So when one speaks of autonomy, one is speaking not
just of the individual, but also of the group.1
Moreover, these "self-constituted communities of meaning" define them-
selves "according to a set of understandings that might be radically dif-
ferent from those that motivate the larger society in which it is embed-
ded."'1 6 In his view, "[t]he nation has a long and unhealthy tradition of
using its laws of general application to try to remake self-constituted
communities of meaning in the model preferred by a larger culture.""'
It is difficult to contest seriously either Carter's description of faith
communities as being situated both within and outside the dominant cul-
tural milieu and also subject to serious pressures to conform their reli-
gious beliefs and practices to the prevailing economic, political, and
moral views of the day. We should take care, when regulating the public
sphere, not to overreach and deny these self-constituted communities of
faith their right to adopt and maintain attitudes and viewpoints that
many in contemporary society might find troubling-or even flatly mis-
11 CARTER, CULTURE OF DISBELIEF, supra note 37, at 142.
"' CARTER, DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED, supra note 23, at 27.
" Id. at 56.
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taken. If we are truly committed to a meaningful form of freedom of reli-
gious belief, the freedom of conscience must encompass the right to hold
idiosyncratic-even highly offensive-points of view. However, these self-
constituted communities of faith cannot reasonably claim an unlimited
ability to inflict harm on innocent third parties who are not fellow reli-
gious adherents.
In general, to qualify for a First Amendment privilege against com-
pliance with a non-discrimination law, the Supreme Court has focused on
whether an organization's size and membership rules demonstrate a
commitment to restricting its membership or activities in order to ad-
vance an articulable associational interest." Thus, as Justice Byron White
observed in New York State Clubs Association, "an association might be able
to show that it is organized for specific expressive purposes and that it
will not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it
cannot confine its membership to those who share the same sex, for ex-
ample, or the same religion."' On the other hand, however, and as Jus-
tice Sandra Day O'Connor observed in her concurring opinion in this
case, "[p]redominately commercial organizations are not entitled to
claim a First Amendment associational or expressive right to be free from
the anti-discrimination provisions triggered by the law.""' This is because
commercial enterprises do not generally seek to exclude potential cus-
tomers; instead, they generally seek to serve any and all persons who seek
to purchase goods or services. The very nature of a commercial enter-
prise belies any serious claim to either free association or assembly inter-
ests.
Moreover, even if a commercial enterprise could successfully invoke
the rights of association and assembly to justify discrimination against
would-be customers, the Supreme Court, in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, squarely
held that eradicating invidious forms of discrimination constitutes a
"compelling" state interest." Writing for the majority, Justice William
Brennan, Jr., explained that " [w]e are persuaded that Minnesota's com-
pelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens
justifies the impact that application of the statute to the Jaycees may have
.1. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 8, at 2519 (noting that complicity or
conscience claims are particularly problematic because such claims "are explicitly
oriented toward third parties, [and] they present special concerns about third-party
harm"); see also id. at 2580-86 (discussing the problem of third-party harms associated
with both RFRA and non-RFRA religious accommodation claims).
"l N.Y. State Club Ass'n. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1988).
..o Id. at 13.
"2 Id. at 20 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
11 See INAZU, supra note 37, at 13 (arguing that "antidiscrimination norms should
typically prevail when applied to commercial entities").
"' 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984).
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on the male members' associational freedoms. The Supreme Court
also found that the burden of requiring the Jaycees to refrain from sex
discrimination was "the least restrictive means of achieving its ends,"
that the Minnesota anti-discrimination law constituted at most an "inci-
dental abridgment of the Jaycees' protected speech," an abridgement
that was "no greater than is necessary to accomplish the State's legitimate
,,127purposes.
This outcome was a function, in part, of the strength of the state's in-
terest in eradicating discrimination in places of public accommodation.
Because "acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly
available goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils that
government has a compelling interest to prevent-wholly apart from the
point of view such conduct may transmit,"128 the state may regulate the
conduct of organizations like the Jaycees to prohibit intentional forms of
discrimination.
Substantive due process also plainly sets limits on the regulatory
power of the state with respect to our personal relationships and intimate
associations. The state may not proscribe whom a person may marry.129
Indeed, government may not generally regulate our intimate associa-
tions. 1o This constitutional realm of personal autonomy plainly facilitates
individual choices, that may reflect rather direct forms of intentional dis-
crimination based on categories that trigger heightened scrutiny when
used by the government. For example, straight people do not generally
have sex with people of their own gender, whereas gay people usually
prefer members of their own sex for sexual encounters. Both sets of
choices involve exclusions based on sex, yet the power to select sexual
partners, using criteria that the government generally may not use with-
124 Id. at 623.
' Id. at 626.
121 Id. at 628.
127 Id.
128 id.
129 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (holding that both equal
protection and substantive due process principles require the state and federal
governments to recognize same-sex marriage and family rights); Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987) (invalidating a Missouri law prohibiting incarcerated persons
from marrying because marriage constitutes a fundamental right and many
important aspects of the marital relationship "are unaffected by the fact of
confinement or the pursuit of legitimate corrections goals"); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.").
. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that all persons "are
entitled to respect for their private lives" and, accordingly, that "[tihe State cannot
demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime").
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out a special justification, rests at the very heart of the right of privacy
that constitutional liberty protects.3 1
The First Amendment also protects freedom of religious belief.
Whatever debates may exist regarding the rightness, or wrongness, of
Employment Division v. Smith,1 virtually all serious legal academics would
readily, and heartily, agree with Justice Robert Jackson's tatement of the
applicable rule:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to
133
us.
Although often styled as a coerced speech case, one could easily renor-
malize Barnette as being about the freedom of conscience. The same
could be said of Wooley v. Maynard,13 4 a case in which religiously devout
citizens covered up with tape New Hampshire's state motto, "Live Free or
Die."35
James Madison thought religious conscience to be sufficiently im-
portant to include the Free Exercise Clause in the Bill of Rights-as well
as the Establishment Clause.36 Indeed, he described the right to "equal
rights of conscience" as among "the choicest privileges of the people"
and as constituting "great rights" that should be secured against both the
13 See id. at 567 ("When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with
another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the
right to make this choice.").
"' 494 U.S. 872, 879-85, 890 (1990) (holding that rationality review applies to
Free Exercise Clause challenges to neutral laws of general applicability and that a
plaintiff must show that a facially neutral law was motivated by religiously motivated
animus in order to secure heightened scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause).
... W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
134 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding that "the right of freedom of thought
protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all").
135 Id. at 707-08 & n.4; see also id. at 714-15 (upholding First Amendment
challenge to mandatory display of New Hampshire's state motto because "[t]he First
Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from
the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea
they find morally objectionable").
136 See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 451 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see also RONALD J.
KROTOSZYNSKI,JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS LIBEL, "OFFENSIVE"
PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REDRESS OF
GRIEVANCES 109-10 (2012) (discussing Madison's introduction of the Bill of Rights in
the U.S. House of Representatives on June 8, 1789).
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federal and state governments."' Both clauses exist to limit the legitimate
reach of state power into the religious beliefs, and practices, of the Amer-
ican people. A non-discrimination law that attempted to require a reli-
gious organization or group act against its beliefs in the context of its re-
ligious services and rites would plainly violate the autonomy interest that
our Constitution conveys on communities of faith. Accordingly, even the
strongest government commitment to gender equality would not be suf-
ficient to force the Roman Catholic Church, against its will, to ordain
women as priests. The decision as to who may hold a ministerial office is
simply beyond the legitimate reach of state power.
But, suppose a religious entity opens a clothing store. Or a fast food
restaurant. May it apply its religious values and teachings with respect to
its employment practices? Suppose a religious faith believes gender-
integrated workplaces are rife with sin and displeasing to God. Or sup-
pose it believes that God prefers mothers to be full-time caregivers to
their children-rather than participate in the workplace? May it refuse to
hire any women in consequence of these beliefs at its commercial enter-
prises? Suppose too the organization takes the view that all of its work is
motivated by a desire to serve God and advance the tenets of the faith.
This is essentially where the point of conflict between religious accom-
modation and the public market becomes most acute.
There may be a small subset of businesses that are so completely and
thoroughly integrated with the religious mission of a church that the
church should be able to extend, by analogy, its freedom from direct
forms of government regulation that require it to violate the tenets of the
faith. For example, a small gift shop, selling devotional items and books
related to the faith, located in a cathedral, constitutes a part of the ca-
thedral itself. It is simply not a Barnes & Noble or Amazon equivalent.
Moreover, few members of the public seeking the latest Stephen King
horror novel are apt to look for such a title in a cathedral gift shop.
Primary, middle, and high schools affiliated with a religious organi-
zation also seem like fairly obvious candidates for recognition as exten-
sions of the core faith mission.3 8 Most church-sponsored K-12 programs
aim to integrate the tenets of the faith comprehensively within and across
"S 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 136, at 452-53. Madison explained his
effort to amend the federal Constitution to protect the rights of trial by jury, a free
press, and liberty of conscience against the state governments, as well as the federal
government, as arising from his fear that "there is more danger of those powers being
abused by the State Governments than by the Government of the United States." Id.
at 458. Madison specifically reiterated the pressing need to prohibit state
governments from "violat[ing] the equal right of conscience." Id. at 452.
.. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
171, 177 (2012).
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the curriculum." To be sure, a class on physics or biology is not an exer-
cise in the Catechism. Yet, it would require a kind of willful blindness not
to recognize that the very existence of the school relates to an effort to
inculcate and advance the teachings of the faith in younger adherents. If
a church-related primary, middle, or secondary school wishes to employ
discriminatory criteria in selecting the staff (across the board), it should
be able to do so. Once again, a parent seeking educational services for a
child, or a teacher seeking employment, is unlikely to present herself at a
Madrassa if she is not an adherent of Islam. And, if she is an adherent of
Islam, facing religious or gender-based requirements for employment will
hardly be surprising.
There is also less of a dignitarian harm in being rejected when the
enterprise at issue is integrated with a community of faith in an obvious
and comprehensive fashion. The exclusion relates to the lack of mem-
bership within the self-constituted community of faith-the church, tem-
ple, or mosque simply does not hold itself out as equally open and availa-
ble to both believers and non-believers on the same terms; the entity
exists in part to permit the faithful to self-organize themselves within the
community-as a distinct and separate community of faith.o
When a church opens a fast food restaurant, however, that is indis-
tinguishable from any other similar restaurant, the would-be customer
has no reason to anticipate that her sex, race, religion, or sexual orienta-
tion will have any impact or bearing on her ability to seek and obtain ser-
vice. Being told "we don't serve your kind" thus represents a kind of rude
slap across the face-and without any prior warning. This constitutes a
significant dignitarian injury, a kind of psychic assault, which the state,
through government regulation, has the legitimate power to prevent and
to punish.
See id. at 190-92 (holding that a teacher in a pervasively religious K-12 school
is engaged in a ministerial function). Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr., observed that
"[t]he [ministerial] exception ... ensures that the authority to select and control who
will minister to the faithful-a matter 'strictly ecclesiastical'-is the church's alone."
Id. at 194-95 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox
Church, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)).
1o See CARTER, CULTURE OF DISBELIEF, supra note 37, at 40, 142-43. Professor
Carter strongly argues that government should respect the ability of "self-constituted
communities of faith that it has nurtured" to maintain their distinctive beliefs and
practices-even if those beliefs and practices conflict with the prevailing economic,
political, and moral sentiments of the larger body politic. CARTER, DISSENT OF THE
GOVERNED, supra note 23, at 53.
14' Let me hasten to add that the owners of private businesses hould be free to
advance or oppose whatever religiously motivated beliefs and policies that they think
best. For example, Chick-fil-A's ownership has achieved some notoriety over its strong
opposition to same-sex marriage. See Timothy Egan, Conscience of a Corporation, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 3, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1MJrdBT (noting that Chick-fil-A has a corporate
non-discrimination policy with respect to sexual orientation that it adopted "[a]fter
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V. GOVERNMENT MAY NOT SUBSIDIZE OR OFFER TARGETED
SUPPORT TO PERVASIVELY DISCRIMINATORY ENTERPRISES
To what extent may government offer targeted subsidies to religious
organizations that engage in religiously motivated discrimination that the
state itself may not embrace or advance? At least arguably, a state gov-
ernment should not be any more free to indirectly support private, reli-
giously motivated discrimination (of whatever stripe) than it would be to
legislate directly to command such discrimination. What's more, the Su-
preme Court clearly embraced this logic in the 1970s in the context of
targeted aid to pervasively segregated private K-12 schools-schools or-
ganized in order to permit white parents to send their offspring to all-
white private, often pervasively sectarian ("Christian"), segregated acad-
emies.
The government may not do indirectly that which it may not do di-
rectly. Accordingly, in thinking about government contracting and sub-
condemning same-sex marriage and becoming a culture-war battleground"). Under
the First Amendment, Chick-fil-A's owners have an absolute right to enter the
marketplace of ideas and advocate for public policies that are consistent with their
religious beliefs. What they do not have a legal, or constitutional, right to do is to
pervasively discriminate against sexual minorities in the operation of their fast food
restaurants. It bears noting that, to the best of my knowledge, there are no reported
incidents of Chick-fil-A seeking to discriminate against LGBT customers or
employees. See id. We should all readily recognize that non-discrimination laws do not
require business owners to be neutral in matters of public policy-whether or not
advocacy has a religious or secular basis. Provided that a business owner complies
with applicable non-discrimination laws, they are constitutionally entitled to be
zealous advocates for policies that anti-discrimination laws proscribe. As Justice
Holmes so eloquently observed in Abram,
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitu-
tion.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Thus, the
First Amendment protects the expression and dissemination of political beliefs in if
not absolute, then nearly absolute, terms. It does not, however, protect conduct or
action based on such beliefs. See Corbin, supra note 58, at 244-57, 267-74. Thus, a
business owner would be quite free to advocate the repeal of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 because she holds a sincere religious belief that integrated public spaces are
displeasing to God; she would not, however, be free to operate her business on a
racially-segregated basis. See id. at 268-71. Simply put, conduct and belief stand on
different constitutional ground. Id. at 271-74, 298-301.
142 H.B. 1523 is particularly objectionable in this regard in that it expressly
requires the state government to offer targeted forms of support to individuals and
businesses that pervasively discriminate against LGBT persons. See H.R. 1523, 2016
Leg., Reg. Sess § 4(1) (a)-(g) (Miss. 2016). The law does a remarkably good job of
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sidies, if the government itself may not refuse service based on a particu-
lar characteristic, such as race or sexual orientation, it may not provide
targeted support to an entity that practices discrimination as a tenet of
the faith. To permit targeted subsidies to pervasively discriminatory enti-
ties is to facilitate government complicity, and responsibility for, discrim-
ination. Religious groups have a right to exclude based on race, sex, reli-
gion, disability, or sexual orientation-but they do not have a right to
targeted state support for such efforts. Indeed, Nonood v. Harrison sug-
gests that targeted support of pervasively discriminatory religiously-
affiliated enterprises violates the Equal Protection Clause.
In Norwood, the Supreme Court prohibited the State of Mississippi
from offering direct support to pervasively discriminatory private schools
in the form of textbooks. Mississippi maintained a textbook loan pro-
gram for students in public, parochial, and private schools. Incident to
this program, the state regularly loaned textbooks for use at pervasively
145segregated private schools. Although the three-judge district court con-
sidering the constitutional complaint sustained the program against an
Equal Protection Clause challenge,'1 the Supreme Court unanimously
reversed.14 7
In finding that Mississippi's practice of loaning textbooks to students
for use in pervasively segregated private schools violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, Chief Justice Burger explained that even if "[i]nvidious
private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising free-
dom of association protected by the First Amendment," such discrimina-
tion "has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.",4 1
Moreover, "although the Constitution does not proscribe private bias, it
places no value on discrimination .... "
If the contemporary Supreme Court remains committed to the prin-
ciples of Nonood, then it would necessarily follow that states may not pro-
vide targeted support to pervasively discriminatory businesses-even if
one could envision a viable First Amendment free association claim by a
business open to the public that encompassed a right to refuse service to
members of particular minority communities. To state the point more
directly, even if government may not constitutionally prohibit invidious
forms of discrimination by private individuals and truly private associa-
tions, it may not lend them targeted support.
giving private businesses in Mississippi a near-total license to discriminate against
sexual minorities and transgender persons.
143 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
1 Id. at 463-69.
"" See id. at 459-60.
146 Id. at 460-61.
"1 Id. at 471.
4 Id. at 470.
14 Id. at 469.
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As Chief Justice Burger noted in Norwood, "Racial discrimination in
state-operated schools is barred by the Constitution and '[i]t is also axi-
omatic that a state may not induce, encourage or promote private per-
sons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish."'50
Of course, pervasively discriminatory organizations and groups are enti-
tled to the benefit of general state-supported services, such as access to
public utilities (water, sewer service, and trash collection), as well as to
police and fire protection.' The question in any given case turns on
whether the state has granted itself a monopoly over a particular good or
service or, on the other hand, whether the particular good or service is
readily available "on the open market."5 1
My point here is that, in some ways, enacting laws that enable reli-
giously motivated organizations, including businesses, to engage in tar-
geted forms of discrimination constitutes something of a double-edged
sword. To be sure, mini-RFRAs or "conscience" laws like Mississippi's
H.B. 1523 immunize religiously motivated discriminatory behavior. To
the extent that these laws facilitate religiously motivated conduct that
might otherwise engender legal liability-for example, a civil action for
breach of contract-they empower people of faith to comport their busi-
ness practices with the dictates of their faith. On the other hand, when a
business proprietor festoons her store with "We Don't Serve Homosexu-
als" signs, as Professor Laycock has suggested, in order to avoid disap-
pointment by would-be homosexual customers,1 5 3 the state, as a matter of
150 Id. at 465 (citing Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 475-76
(M.D. Ala. 1967) (alteration in original)).
151Id Id.
152 Id.
15' LAYCOCK, EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 30, at 198-200 (proposing,
evidently seriously, that business owners who do not wish to provides goods or
services to homosexuals should post public signs so stating and blithely noting that
"the stream of commerce might be sprinkled with public notices of discriminatory
intent"). Professor Laycock unironically observes that "[i]n more traditional
communities, same-sex couples planning a wedding might be forced to pick and
choose their merchants carefully, like black families driving across the South a half
century ago." Id. at 200. Laycock characterizes the injury that same-sex couples
subjected to such "No Queers" signs would suffer as mere "hurt feelings" and suggests
that " [h]urt feelings or personal offense are so far not a basis for censorship of ideas
in American law." Id. at 198. This argument contains two mistakes-one of fact and
one of law. The mistake of fact relates to the nature of the core injury: it is not "hurt
feelings or personal offense," but rather conduct, namely, a denial of access to goods
or services available to anyone else. See Corbin, supra note 58, at 273-74. Thus, when a
business owner denies an LGBT person service, she engages in conduct, not just
speech. See id. at 274 ("In analyzing the conduct versus speech distinction in the
context of services provided by businesses open to the public, it would appear that
conducting a commercial transaction is ultimately conduct."). Just as the operation of
a racially segregated lunch counter in the Jim Crow South involved conduct, not
merely speech, even if the policy is aided by a "Whites Only" sign in the front window
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well-settled Equal Protection jurisprudence, must disassociate itself with
the business.
For example, a state agency should not be permitted to spend state
funds at a bakery that refuses service to a same-sex couple seeking a wed-
ding cake. There is no material difference between providing textbooks
to a pervasively discriminatory K-12 school and purchasing baked goods
from a discriminatory bakery. Accordingly, if so-called "conscience" laws
are not unconstitutional because they have the purpose and effect of en-
couraging private discrimination, individuals and businesses that avail
themselves of the protection of those laws may not enjoy direct forms of
state support.
VI. CONCLUSION
State laws enacted to facilitate, indeed encourage, discrimination
against LGBT persbns are not consistent with the imperatives of the
Equal Protection Clause-any more than state laws and local ordinances
aimed at encouraging and facilitating race-based discrimination survived
constitutional scrutiny in the 1960s and 1970s. Accordingly, it seems like-
ly that the federal courts will invalidate laws like Mississippi's noxious
H.B. 1523 on the authority of Obergefell, Windsor, Lawrence, and Romer.5 4
Indeed, as Justice O'Connor argued in her concurring opinion in Law-
rence, state laws that seek to codify animus against minorities (however de-
fined) do not advance a legitimate'government policy and are, accord-
155
ingly, invalid on equal protection grounds.
(which presumably Professor Laycock thinks would constitute a useful signal to
people of color who might otherwise mistakenly seek service at the venue). The
mistake of law involves the concept of a pervasively hostile work environment in the
context of Title VII, a cause of action that may be established entirely through pure
speech, provided that the speech creates a workplace that no reasonable person of
color or woman would reasonably tolerate. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 64-65 (1986); see also CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 29 (1979). To be sure, some
libertarian legal academics object to the hostile work environment theory of Title VII
liability because it creates civil liability for speech. Eugene Volokh, How Harassment
Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 563, 574-77 (1995). To date, however,
the federal courts have shown no interest in embracing this argument and have
routinely permitted hostile work environment claims to go forward.
154 See Oleske, Unequal Treatment, supra note 10, at 143-47 (arguing that targeted
exemptions from anti-discrimination laws to facilitate denials of service to LGBT
persons would violate the Equal Protection Clause). As Oleske straightforwardly states
the proposition, "courts should conclude that carving out -exemptions from
antidiscrimination laws so as to allow commercial business owners to refuse service to
same-sex couples unconstitutionally deprives those couples of equal protection of the
laws." Id. at 146.
.55 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2017] 1261
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
If, however, laws that seek to immunize private businesses open to
the public from all forms of civil and criminal liability for denying service
to LGBT persons are not facially invalid on Equal Protection grounds,
the federal courts should hold that the use of such laws by business own-
ers to discriminate against sexual minorities and transgender persons
constitutes a form of state action on the nexus or state encouragement
theory.'5 Because the state itself may not directly command discrimina-
tion against would-be LGBT customers, it may not seek to achieve that
same objective indirectly by giving a wink and a nudge to private busi-
nesses to engage in such discrimination.' The 1960s cases finding that
state encouragement of racial discrimination made private businesses-
like a Kress lunch counter-state actors, insofar as they acted consistently
with the state's invitation, remain good law and should apply with full
force to laws like H.B. 1523.
Even if I am incorrect to suppose that laws like H.B. 1523 violate the
Equal Protection Clause or transform private businesses into state actors
when they deploy such laws as a license to discriminate, the state must
avoid supporting in any targeted or direct way any and all businesses that
avail themselves of this discretion. Just as Mississippi could not provide
free instructional materials to pervasively segregated private schools in
the wake of Brown,'" Mississippi may not do business with pervasively dis-
criminatory providers of goods and services without running afoul of the
Equal Protection Clause in the wake of Obergefell. In this respect, those
seeking and availing themselves of conscience-based exemptions should
be careful about what they ask for-at least if they wish to do business
with the government or enjoy any direct forms of government support.
At the other end of the spectrum, however, advocates of marriage
equality and the fair treatment of LGBT persons must recognize that the
Constitution protects the ability of citizens to organize themselves into
self-constituted communities of faith. 6 0 The First Amendment rights of
association and assembly, as well as the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses, create a sphere of collective, private autonomy that the state may
not seek to abolish or control. Incident to these rights, both individuals
and groups have a right to advocate and practice values that the state it-
self may not. We maintain a state action doctrine precisely in order to
protect these autonomy interests. As I have argued previously, "[t]he
1 See Krotoszynski, supra note 101, at 320-21, 339-42.
1 On the potentially benign uses of government "nudges" to encourage
individuals to engage in beneficial behaviors, see RICHARD H. THALER & CAss R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONs ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS
(2008).
5 See supra notes 81-108 and accompanying text.
* Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973).
" CARTER, DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED, supra note 23, at 29, 53-56.
.. See id. at 53-87.
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state action doctrine is a necessary analytical construct; it permits courts
to hold the government accountable and protects the freedom of indi-
vidual citizens to make fundamental decisions about their economic, so-
cial, religious, and personal relationships."1 2
In particular, government regulation of communities of faith, with
respect to the tenets of the faith and how such communities regulate ac-
cess to their rites and sacraments, presents most serious constitutional is-
sues. To state the matter simply, government has a much firmer constitu-
tional basis for regulating a Taco Bell or Kroger than a church,
synagogue, mosque, or temple. The First Amendment protects assembly,
association, and free exercise; our society's commitment to securing
equality in the agora must not extend beyond the public marketplace in-
to private homes and places of worship.
As readily and emphatically as we should reject demands from busi-
nesses open to the public for exemptions from comprehensive anti-
discrimination laws, we should no less readily accept and vindicate the
claims of private religious organizations to restrict membership in their
self-constituted communities to those persons who fully subscribe to their
articles of faith and demonstrate this adherence through their lived be-
havior. However, religious organizations cannot enter the public market-
place as a buyer or seller of general goods and services and plausibly
claim that their religious identity provides them with an absolute immun-
ity from neutral laws of general applicability designed to make the agora
open and available to all citizens on equal terms. Just as the state may
condition the sale of foodstuffs on maintaining sanitary conditions, it
may also condition the sale of foodstuffs on agreeing to serve all mem-
bers of the public.6 3
162 Krotoszynski, supra note 101, at 346-47; see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) ("Careful adherence to the 'state action' requirement
preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and
federal judicial power."). But cf Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U.
L. REv. 503, 524-27 (1985) (advocating the abolition of the state action requirement
in favor of direct rights balancing when private parties engage in behavior that would
be unconstitutional if undertaken by the government).
' As Justice Brennan cogently observed, discrimination in places of public
accommodation constitutes a serious social evil-an evil akin to acts of violence that
the state has a compelling interest in eradicating. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 628 (1984) (analogizing invidious forms of discrimination in places of public
accommodation to socially harmful expressive conduct akin to acts of physical
violence that enjoy no constitutional protection under the First Amendment); see also
Corbin, supra note 58, at 293-94 (arguing that "anti-discrimination laws can be
characterized as regulating conduct," that "free speech challenges to public
accommodation laws should be dismissed," and that even if such laws affect speech
rather than conduct, they advance a compelling government interest in "equal
citizenship and equal dignity").
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Although touching on matters of great importance, these problems
are not particularly difficult to resolve-provided we have a firm grasp of
the public and private sphere and maintain a bright line demarcating the
boundary where the private ceases to be sufficiently "private" to justify
immunities from otherwise applicable general marketplace regulations.
The Supreme Court's existing jurisprudence on the freedom of associa-
tion provides a useful, and highly suitable, framework for distinguishing
the truly private from the truly public. If an entity wishes to invoke the
First Amendment as a shield for policies and practices that otherwise
would violate civil rights laws that seek to prohibit invidious forms of dis-
crimination, it should take care to ensure that it is sufficiently non-public
to justify a constitutional exemption from an otherwise applicable anti-
discrimination law.
